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Appointed Counsel and Jury Trial: The
Rights that Undermine the Other
Rights
Russell L. Christopher*
Abstract
Do the Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury
trial unconstitutionally conflict with defendants’ other
constitutional rights? For indigents charged with felonies, Gideon
v. Wainwright guarantees the right to appointed counsel; for
misdemeanors, Scott v. Illinois limits the right to indigents
receiving the most severe authorized punishment—imprisonment.
Duncan v. Illinois limits the right to jury trial to defendants
charged with serious offenses. Consequently, the greater the
jeopardy faced by defendants, the greater the eligibility for
appointed counsel and jury trial. But defendants’ other
constitutional rights generally facilitate just the opposite—
minimizing jeopardy by reducing charges, lessening the likelihood
of guilt, and lowering the likelihood and severity of punishment—
thereby reducing eligibility for appointed counsel and jury trial.
Therefore, defendants potentially face the following coercive
dilemma: either exercise numerous constitutional rights, but at the
cost of relinquishing the rights to appointed counsel and jury trial,
or enjoy appointed counsel and jury trial, but at the cost of
relinquishing numerous other constitutional rights. This Article
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. Thanks to
Andrew Ashworth, Brittany Deitch, Donald Dripps, Amanda Frost, Stephen
Galoob, Youngjae Lee, Ken Levy, Janet Moore, Anthony O’Rourke, Mary
Margaret Penrose, Tamara Piety, Jeffrey Schmitt, Barry Sullivan, Emily Garcia
Uhrig, and Ekow Yankah for their helpful comments. The University of Tulsa
College of Law provided a generous research grant. I also thank participants in
the Constitutional Law Colloquium at Loyola University Chicago School of Law,
the American Constitution Society Constitutional Law Scholars Forum at Barry
University School of Law, and the Philosophical Perspectives on Criminal
Procedure conference at Osgoode Hall Law School where previous versions of this
Article were presented.
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argues that Gideon, Scott and Duncan unconstitutionally burden,
penalize, chill, and deter defendants’ exercise of ten constitutional
rights afforded by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Additionally, Gideon and Scott-based conflicts may
independently violate the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses: non-indigents retaining counsel enjoy all their rights while
indigents enjoy only some. The simple remedy, resolving all of the
conflicts, is extending the Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel to all indigents and the right to jury trial to all defendants.
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I. Introduction
Though most constitutional rights of criminal defendants are
apportioned equally,1 some are not. For example, while the Sixth
Amendment provides all criminal defendants with the right to
assistance of counsel,2 it provides only some—the indigent—with
appointed counsel at State expense.3 And while only indigents
1. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1972) (noting that
the rights to a public trial, to be informed of the accusation, to confront one’s
accusers, to compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses, to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to a speedy trial apply in prosecutions
regardless of whether the offense is a felony, misdemeanor, or petty offense).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
3. See Allison D. Kuhns, If You Cannot Afford an Attorney, Will One be
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enjoy such counsel, not all do.4 Gideon v. Wainright5 guarantees
indigents charged with felonies the right to appointed counsel;6 for
indigents charged with mere misdemeanors, Scott v. Illinois7
limits the right to those receiving imprisonment.8 Similarly,
Duncan v. Louisiana9 limits the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial10 to defendants charged with “serious crimes” (punishable by
more than six months’ imprisonment).11 Consequently, the
distribution of these Sixth Amendment rights entails some
inequities. But if these rights are to be distributed unequally,
apportioning them in proportion to offense or punishment
severity—serious charges and punishment trigger heightened
procedural protections—is seemingly rational. The converse, or a
disproportional distribution (the less jeopardy faced by defendants,
the greater the procedural protections), rejected by the Supreme
Court as “so outrageous and so obviously a perversion of all sense
of proportion,”12 would be seemingly irrational. This Article
argues, however, that the proportional, seemingly rational
Appointed for You?: How (Some) States Force Criminal Defendants to Choose
Between Posting Bond and Getting a Court-Appointed Attorney, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1787, 1795 (2012) (“In the wake of Gideon, states were left with a mandate . . . to
provide legal services to indigent defendants.”).
4. See infra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See Kuhns, supra note 3, at 1793 (noting that Gideon overruled Betts v.
Brady, which “declined to incorporate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
all state felony proceedings” (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471–73 (1942),
overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))).
7. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
8. See id. at 373–74 (“We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent
criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”).
9. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
11. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154 (finding that “the right to jury trial in
serious criminal cases is a fundamental right and hence must be recognized by
the States as part of their obligation to extend due process of law to all persons
within their jurisdiction”).
12. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (referring to a
disproportional distribution—decreased jeopardy increases right eligibility—of
the right to counsel).
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distribution of these Sixth Amendment rights causes
unconstitutional conflicts with defendants’ other constitutional
rights that both equal and disproportional distributions avoid.13
Rather than rearguing what the Supreme Court continues to
resist—that Sixth Amendment right inequities are unfair and
illogical,14 this Article indirectly supports an equal distribution by
demonstrating an underlying and overlooked design flaw with the
Court’s proportional distribution.15 It makes the novel argument
that Gideon, Scott, and Duncan’s proportional distribution of the
Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial
impairs defendants’ exercise of their other constitutional rights.16
Furthermore, by impinging on defendants’ other rights, Gideon
and Scott violate the rationales underpinning both the broader
right to the assistance of counsel—ensuring “that all other rights
of the accused are protected”17—and the narrower right to
appointed counsel—ensuring that indigents “stand[] equal before
the law.”18 Similarly, Duncan violates the rationale undergirding
the right to jury trial—“supporting” and “complement[ing]”
defendants’ other rights.19 Rather than protecting and supporting

13. See infra Part V.C.
14. See infra Part II.A–B.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part III.
17. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988). See also id. (“Of all the rights that
an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.”
(quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1956))); Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1049, 1051 (2013) (referring to the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance
of counsel “[a]s the right that ensures that ‘all other rights of the accused are
protected’” (quoting Penson, 488 U.S. at 84)).
18. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“From the very
beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis
on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.”).
19. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (“[T]he structure
and style of the criminal process—the supporting framework and the subsidiary
procedures—are of the sort that naturally complement jury trial, and have
developed in connection with and in reliance upon jury trial.”).
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defendants’ other rights, this Article argues that Gideon, Scott,
and Duncan unconstitutionally undermine them.20
The argument advances by sequentially addressing the
following four issues. First, does the proportional distribution of
these Sixth Amendment rights create the potential for conflicts
with defendants’ other constitutional rights?21 If so, second, are
there procedural contexts in which these potentially conflicting
constitutional rights actually conflict?22 If so, third, are these
actual conflicts unconstitutional?23 If so, and finally, what is the
resolution to or remedy for these unconstitutional conflicts?24
As to the first issue, the proportional distribution of the rights
to appointed counsel and jury trial are in tension with the general
function of defendants’ other constitutional rights.25 The Gideon,
Scott, and Duncan rights attach or strengthen with increasing
offense or punishment severity.26 But the general function of
defendants’ other constitutional rights facilitates just the
opposite—minimizing the seriousness of charge, minimizing the
likelihood of guilt, and minimizing the likelihood and severity of
punishment.27 For example, the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures,28 the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination,29 and the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine adverse witnesses30
facilitate a defendant’s minimization of inculpatory evidence.
Other constitutional rights—the Due Process Clause31 rights to
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part II.A–B.
27. See infra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.”).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person
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testify in one’s own defense32 and discover evidence in the
prosecutor’s
possession33—facilitate
the
development
of
exculpatory evidence. Suppressing inculpatory evidence and
raising exculpatory evidence minimize the severity of charge and
punishment, and minimize the likelihood of guilt and
punishment.34 In turn, that diminishes the applicability of
proportionally allocated rights, including the rights to appointed
counsel and jury trial.
This tension between proportional allocations of the Gideon,
Scott, and Duncan rights and the function of defendants’ other
constitutional rights creates the potential for conflicting
constitutional rights.35 It places defendants in a coercive dilemma.
To enjoy the rights to appointed counsel or jury trial, defendants
may have to forego exercise of other constitutional rights; exercise
of these other rights may preclude enjoyment of the rights to
appointed counsel and jury trial.
To illustrate how this potential for conflict could result in an
actual conflict, suppose an indigent is charged with both a
misdemeanor (ineligible for appointed counsel under Scott and
jury trial under Duncan) and a felony (for which Gideon and
Duncan guarantee those rights). Because the misdemeanor and
felony arise out of the same act or transaction, the indigent
receives a jury trial and appointed counsel for both charges.36 The
indigent has a possible Fifth Amendment double jeopardy37 claim
against only the felony.38 Prevailing on the claim, resulting in
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
32. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (holding that a
defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause “right to have his
counsel question him to elicit his statement”).
33. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (ruling that the
prosecution’s suppression of exculpatory evidence violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
34. Cf. id. at 87–88 (“A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an
accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the
penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant.”).
35. See infra Part III.
36. See infra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”).
38. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment
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dismissal of the felony, would leave the sole charge of the
misdemeanor (ineligible for appointed counsel and jury trial). The
indigent has two options. First, assert her right against double
jeopardy with the possible benefit of dismissal of the felony, but at
the cost of loss of appointed counsel and jury trial for the remaining
misdemeanor. Second, forego exercising her right against double
jeopardy at the cost of still facing the felony, but with the benefit
of maintaining appointed counsel and jury trial for both charges.
She faces the dilemma of a forced choice between enjoying either
her two Sixth Amendment rights, or her Fifth Amendment right.
If she chooses her Sixth Amendment rights, Gideon and Duncan
chilled and deterred exercise of the Fifth Amendment right; if she
instead chooses her Fifth Amendment right, Gideon and Duncan
burden and penalize exercising this right. Because enjoying her
Sixth Amendment rights may require foregoing her Fifth
Amendment right and vice-versa, the rights conflict.
This Article demonstrates that Gideon, Scott, and Duncan,
under some circumstances, conflict with ten constitutional rights
emanating from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.39 It argues that these conflicts are unconstitutional
on four independent bases.40 First, burdening, penalizing, chilling,
or deterring the exercise of a constitutional right is generally
unconstitutional.41 For example, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Jackson42 invalidated a statute authorizing capital
punishment through a jury (but not a bench) trial because it
“impose[d] an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a

[Double Jeopardy Clause] forbids successive prosecution and cumulative
punishment for a greater and lesser included offense.”).
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (noting that
“penaliz[ing] a person’s reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently unconstitutional’”
(quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32–33, n.20 (1973)); Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (“There are rights of constitutional stature whose
exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.”). This principle,
however, is not uniformly applied. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,
218 (1978) (“[N]ot every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not
every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.”).
42. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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constitutional right”43 by “deter[ring] exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial.”44 Just as the statute in
Jackson required greater procedural protections (jury trial) for a
more serious charge and punishment (a capital crime and
punishment), so also Gideon, Scott, and Duncan provide greater
procedural protections for more serious charges and punishment.45
Just as the statute in Jackson unconstitutionally burdened and
deterred exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, so
also Gideon, Scott, and Duncan unconstitutionally burden and
deter defendants’ exercise of ten other constitutional rights.46
Related to the first basis, the second basis addresses multiple
constitutional rights burdening or deterring each other.47
Generally, “a defendant should not be forced to relinquish one
constitutional right to obtain another.”48 Of course, some
constitutional rights—those that are “logical converses” to one
another—do conflict, constitutionally.49 For example, defendants
have both the right to testify and to remain silent.50 Defendants
cannot possibly simultaneously exercise both rights—defendants
must necessarily choose one or the other—“because the two
activities are logically incompatible.”51 But the appointed counsel
and jury trial rights and the rights with which both conflict are not
such logically opposed rights. As rights meant to protect and
complement the other rights, the rights to appointed counsel and

43. Id. at 572.
44. Id. at 581.
45. See infra Part II.
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See infra Part IV.B.
48. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 608 (5th ed. 2009).
49. See Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One
Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 743 n.7
(1981) (stating that “the assertion of [some rights] can be constitutionally
conditioned on the forfeiture of [an]other, because the condition results—not from
anything that the state could prevent—but from the very nature of the
constitutional entitlements at issue”).
50. See id. (highlighting the fact that the right to take the witness stand in
one’s defense and the right to not take the witness stand at one’s trial are logical
converses of one another).
51. Id.
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jury trial are to be enjoyed in tandem with the other rights.52 Apart
from this exception for logically opposed rights, the Supreme Court
in Simmons v. United States53 declared, “we find it intolerable that
one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another.”54 The rationale for the Simmons principle is as
follows: “When the exercise of one right is made contingent upon
the forbearance of another, both rights are corrupted.”55 Based on
the Simmons principle, Gideon and Duncan (but not Scott)
unconstitutionally place defendants in coercive dilemmas in which
constitutional rights must be relinquished in order to ensure
enjoyment of the Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial and
appointed counsel, and vice-versa.
The third and fourth bases are the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.56 While due process
concerns fairness between the State and the individual, equal
protection requires the State to treat equally classes of individuals
who are equally situated.57 While conceptually distinct, “[d]ue
process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s
analysis [of indigents’ rights].”58 For example, declaring that
“[b]oth equal protection and due process emphasize [that all
defendants] ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every
American court,’” the Court in Griffin v. Illinois59 found that
burdening indigents’ ability to appeal by refusing to supply a free
trial transcript violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses.60 Similarly, the deterring and coercing relinquishment of
52. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
53. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
54. Id. at 394.
55. United States v. Wilcox, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
57. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (“‘Due process’
emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State,
regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. ‘Equal
protection,’ on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State
between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.”).
58. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983).
59. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
60. See id. at 17, 19–20 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241
(1940)).
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numerous constitutional rights caused by Gideon and Scott befalls
only indigents. Non-indigents retaining counsel need not
relinquish other rights to ensure enjoying the assistance of
counsel, as do indigents.61 While non-indigents enjoy all their
constitutional rights, indigents enjoy only some.62 By making
indigents stand unequally “before the bar of justice,”63 Gideon and
Scott (but not Duncan) may violate both due process and equal
protection. While derived from the conflicts, the possible due
process and equal protection violations are independent from the
unconstitutionality of the conflicts; that is, even if deemed
constitutional under the first two bases, the conflicts may
independently violate equal protection and due process.64
The Article progresses in the following Parts. Part II situates
the Gideon, Scott, and Duncan rights within a framework of
competing approaches to allocating criminal defendants’
constitutional rights. It distinguishes among three different types
of right distributions based on severity of offense or punishment.65
After explaining how any proportionally distributed right has an
enhanced potential for conflict with other constitutional rights,
Part II supplies a brief overview of the two most prominent
proportionally distributed constitutional rights—appointed
counsel and jury trial.66 Finally, it presents the Supreme Court’s
rationales for the proportional distribution adopted by Gideon,
Scott, and Duncan as well as the criticisms by judges and
commentators favoring an equal allocation of these rights,
regardless of offense or punishment severity.67
Part III demonstrates how this enhanced potential for conflict
yields actual conflicts.68 It presents specific instances where
Gideon, Scott, or Duncan conflict with exercising the following
rights: (i) Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy,
(ii) Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, (iii) Due Process Clause
61. See infra Part IV.B.
62. See infra Part III.
63. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)).
64. See infra Part IV.C.
65. See infra Part II.
66. See infra Part II.A–B.
67. See infra Part II.
68. See infra Part III.A–J.
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right against vindictive prosecution, (iv) Due Process Clause right
to
discovery,
(v) Fifth
Amendment
privilege
against
self-incrimination, (vi) Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
right, (vii) Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment, (viii) Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, (ix) Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, and (x) Due Process Clause right to testify in
one’s own defense.
Part IV supplies four independent bases for the
unconstitutionality of the ten conflicts.69 First, Gideon, Scott, and
Duncan unconstitutionally burden, penalize, chill, and deter
defendants’ exercise of other constitutional rights. Second, Gideon
and Duncan unconstitutionally coerce indigents to relinquish some
constitutional rights to obtain others. Third, the conflicts caused
by Gideon and Scott yield unequal treatment of indigents and
non-indigents. Because non-indigents retaining counsel enjoy all
their rights while indigents enjoy only some, Gideon and Scott
violate equal protection. Fourth, for similar reasons, Gideon and
Scott violate the equality component of due process. Finally, Part
IV rebuts five possible objections to the central argument that the
conflicts are unconstitutional.
Part V considers resolutions to the unconstitutional conflicts.70
It first discusses two existing remedies and two possible ad hoc
remedies focusing on the procedural contexts in which the conflicts
arise. Even collectively, however, these remedies fail to resolve
more than a few of the conflicts.71 Part IV next presents three
remedies that do successfully resolve all ten conflicts. It argues
that one is implausible, another is irrational, and that the only
rational and plausible remedy is extending the Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel to all indigents and jury trial to all
defendants.
The Article concludes that Gideon, Scott, and Duncan’s
proportional and seemingly rational distribution of the rights to
appointed counsel and jury trial—the greater the jeopardy, the
greater the eligibility for the rights—leads to unconstitutional
69.
70.
71.

See infra Part IV.A–D.
See infra Part V.A–C.
See infra Part V.A–B.
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conflicts with ten other constitutional rights.72 The preferable
resolution is extending Gideon and Duncan to all offenses.73
Without a resolution, rather than the rights that support, protect,
and complement defendants’ other constitutional rights, the Sixth
Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial are the
rights that undermine the other rights.
II. Allocating Rights Based on Severity of Offense and
Punishment
To understand how Gideon, Scott, and Duncan potentially
conflict with other constitutional rights of criminal procedure, it is
helpful to understand differing ways to allocate rights. There are
three principal approaches: (i) right applicability increases as
crime or punishment severity increases (“proportional” rights);
(ii) right applicability remains the same regardless of crime or
punishment severity (equal or “transsubstantive” rights74); and,
(iii) right applicability decreases as crime or punishment severity
increases
(inversely
proportional
or,
more
simply,
“disproportional” rights). Most rights are transsubstantive:75 the
rights to a public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation, to confront one’s accusers, to compulsory process
for obtaining favorable witnesses, to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, to a speedy trial,76 to have the prosecution provide proof
of each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,77 to due

72. See infra Part VI.
73. See infra Part V.C.
74. See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 843 (2001) (coining
the term for rights that “ignore[] substantive criminal law distinctions among
crimes” and thus apply equally to all offenses).
75. See id. at 847 (“Like almost everything else in the law of criminal
procedure, the Fourth Amendment [generally] treats one crime just like
another.”).
76. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1972) (describing
the requirement of a public trial as a standard for all criminal prosecutions).
77. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (applying the requirement to
all cases).
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process,78 and to equal protection of the laws.79 While the European
Court of Human Rights applies rights equally (or
transsubstantively) “to all types of criminal offence, from the most
straightforward to the most complex,”80 “[e]very [American]
jurisdiction provides for some procedural differences based upon a
distinction between major and minor crimes.”81
Though
“Fourth
Amendment
law
is
[generally]
transsubstantive,”82 in some instances it adopts a disproportional
allocation. For example, in Tennessee v. Garner,83 the Supreme
Court ruled that police use of lethal force against a fleeing
murderer was constitutional but against a fleeing burglar was a
seizure violating the Fourth Amendment.84 A fleeing criminal’s
Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable seizure thereby
varies depending on the severity of the suspected crime. The
strength of the right decreases—thus allowing lethal force—as the
severity of the crime increases. Following Justice Jackson’s 1949
dissent that maintained “the government should have less power
to engage in searches and seizures when it pursues petty
criminals, such as alcohol smugglers, than when it pursues serious
criminals, such as kidnappers,”85 many commentators and judges
have supported a disproportional allocation.86 Commentators have
78. See State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Tenn. 1995) (“The due process
principle of fundamental fairness applies to all criminal prosecutions, and does
not rest upon the severity of the sanction sought or imposed.”).
79. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971) (“The
invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are
made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the
sentences that may be imposed [or the severity of the offense charged].”).
80. Saunders v. United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 313, [68].
81 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 23.
82. Stuntz, supra note 74, at 847.
83. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
84. See id. at 11, 21 (“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the
officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him
does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 74,
at 847 n.16, 851–52 (providing other examples of disproportionally allocated
Fourth Amendment rights).
85. See Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90
VA. L. REV. 1957, 1959 (2004) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
86. See id. (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949)
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conjectured that but for practical concerns a disproportional
allocation of Fourth Amendment protections would supplant the
predominant transsubstantive approach.87
In contrast to Fourth Amendment or police-limiting rights,
what might be termed adjudicative rights—including the rights to
appointed counsel and jury trial—are sometimes allocated
proportionally to severity of crime or punishment. For example,
“[f]elony defendants possess a bundle of heightened procedural
entitlements—such as rights to a grand jury, a preliminary
hearing, increased discovery . . . that misdemeanor defendants are
often denied.”88 The most serious type of punishment and felony
offense—capital—triggers even greater procedural protections.89
Proportional allocations are axiomatically assumed as a
“basic . . . [and] important principle underlying the criminal
justice system: serious sanctions require serious procedures.”90
Despite being considered axiomatically self-evident, proportional
allocations trigger a problem that transsubstantive and
disproportional allocations avoid.
Proportional rights, by their very nature, have an enhanced
potential to conflict with other rights that, by their very function,
serve to reduce crime or punishment severity. Defendants
(Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 1957 n.1 (citing numerous sources).
87. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 74, at 850 (“If every crime carried its own
search and seizure law, police would find it too costly to learn search and seizure
law, and that law would cease to function.”); Volokh, supra note 88, at 1957–61
(citing “thorny” line-drawing difficulties).
88. Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 780
(2016).
89. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 24–25 (noting that capital offenses
may require “special venue requirements . . . individualized and sequestered voir
dire of jurors . . . a greater number of peremptory challenges . . . [and] special
qualifications for counsel”).
90. Crane, supra note 88, at 782, 830; accord Antony Duff, Presumptions of
Innocence, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 193, 195 (Chad Flanders &
Zachary Hoskins eds., 2016) (asserting the “general principle that the greater the
burden that state action imposes on those subjected to it, the more certain those
who implement it should be that it is warranted”); Darryl K. Brown, Rationing
Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 801, 809, 818 (2004) (noting that limited funds require that the
right to appointed counsel should be “rationed” to those facing the most serious
offenses).
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generally exercise their rights in order to avoid or minimize
liability and punishment. Some rights block or minimize
inculpatory evidence; other rights foster the development or timely
deployment of exculpatory evidence.91 Successful exercise of these
rights may reduce the severity of offense charged or punishment
imposed. In turn, that reduction of offense or punishment severity
reduces applicability of proportional rights—rights that attach or
strengthen as the severity of the offense or punishment increases.
Consequently, successful exercise of some rights may result in the
loss of or failure to attain proportional rights. Maintaining or
attaining proportional rights may require foregoing exercise of
other rights that reduce offense or punishment severity.
Proportional rights, by their very nature, potentially place
right-holders in the dilemma of having to choose between rights.
Because proportional rights attach as offense or punishment
severity increases, but defendants generally exercise their rights
to decrease offense and punishment severity, proportional rights
have an enhanced potential to conflict with other rights.
In contrast to proportional rights, neither transsubstantive
nor disproportional rights have the same enhanced capacity for
conflict. A defendant reducing the severity of offense or
punishment by the successful exercise of rights does not diminish
applicability of transsubstantive rights because they apply equally
regardless of offense or punishment severity. Similarly,
defendants reducing the severity of offense or punishment by the
successful exercise of rights only increase, not decrease,
applicability of disproportional rights because those attach or
strengthen as offense or punishment severity decreases. As a
result, transsubstantive and disproportional rights, by their very
nature, lack the same potential for conflict with other rights as
proportional rights.
While any proportional right incurs this problem of potential
conflict, this Article will limit its focus on perhaps the two most
important proportional rights—appointed counsel and jury trial.92
Their importance to defendants only makes the problem worse.
The more valuable the proportional right, the more attractive
foregoing other rights to maintain or attain the proportional right
91.
92.

See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A–B.
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becomes. And that only increases the likelihood of conflict between
the rights to appointed counsel and jury trial, and other rights.
Before demonstrating specific, actual conflicts in Part III, this Part
supplies some background on the rights to appointed counsel and
jury trial.
A. Appointed Counsel
As to the right to the assistance of retained counsel, the
long-standing English common law rule in effect at the time of the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment utilized a disproportional
allocation: misdemeanor, but not felony, defendants enjoyed the
right.93 “[T]he rule was constantly, vigorously and sometimes
passionately assailed by English statesmen and lawyers.”94
William Blackstone skeptically questioned: “For upon what face of
reason can that assistance [of counsel] be denied to save the life of
a man, which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty
trespass?”95 The English rule found little favor in colonial America
as well.96 Twelve of the original thirteen colonies granted a right
to retained counsel for serious offenses and most also granted the
right for all offenses.97 Eliminating entirely differentiations of the
right based on seriousness of charge, the Sixth Amendment
93. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (“Originally, in
England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of
counsel . . . [but] persons accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the full
assistance of counsel.”); JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL 3 (2002) (“For less serious crimes . . . a defendant could employ a lawyer
to present his defense. . . . Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the British
courts strictly adhered to a common law rule that prohibited those accused of
serious offenses from employing lawyers to present their defense.”).
94. Powell, 287 U.S. at 60.
95. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *355.
96. See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 (“The rule was rejected by the colonies.”);
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 93, at 9 (“[M]ost of the colonies departed dramatically
from the restrictive approach to counsel of the British common law.”).
97. See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 64 (“[I]n at least twelve of the thirteen
colonies the rule of the English common law . . . had been definitely rejected and
the right to counsel fully recognized in [almost] all criminal prosecutions.”);
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 93, at 9 (“[A]t least eleven of the thirteen states had
enacted, either by constitution or statute, a general right to be represented by
counsel and one accorded the right as a matter of common law.”).
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provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”98
When the Supreme Court recognized a right to appointed
counsel for indigents, it did so by reinstituting differentiations of
the right based on crime severity that the Sixth Amendment
rejected for retained counsel. In 1932, Powell v. Alabama99 granted
the right to appointed counsel for indigents charged with capital
offenses.100 Johnson v. Zerbst101 extended the Powell right to
federal indigent defendants charged with non-capital, felony
offenses.102 In 1963, Gideon extended the right to all indigent
felony defendants.103
It was not until 1972 that the Court addressed the right’s
application to misdemeanors.104 Argersinger v. Hamlin105 held that
indigents receiving imprisonment enjoyed a right to appointed
counsel at trial.106 While Scott construed Argersinger as requiring
the right “regardless of the cost to the States,” Scott defended its
refusal to extend the Argersinger right to misdemeanors merely
authorizing
imprisonment
because
it
would
“impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite
diverse States.”107 Under Scott’s “actual imprisonment” standard,
in order for imprisonment to be imposed post-trial, the judge must
appoint counsel pre-trial.108 Thus in deciding whether to appoint
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
99. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
100. Id. at 69.
101. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
102. See id. at 463 (“The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in
all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life
or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”).
103. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
104. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 25 (1972) (examining the extent
to which the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel).
105. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
106. Id. at 40.
107. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); see also id. at 384 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (construing “[t]he apparent reason” for the majority’s not granting
the right to appointed counsel to all defendants as a “concern for the economic
burden” it would impose on the States).
108. See, e.g., id. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that trial judges must
decide whether or not to appoint counsel “in advance of hearing any evidence and
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counsel, the judge must determine during pre-trial the likelihood
of guilt and the imposition of imprisonment. By reversing the
normal chronology of evidence first and judgment second, Scott
places “the cart of punishment before the horses of trial, evidence,
and guilt.”109 Despite criticism of Scott as “illogical in principle and
unworkable in practice,”110 “the Court appears firmly committed to
utilizing the actual imprisonment standard as the sole Sixth
Amendment dividing line for requiring appointed counsel in
misdemeanor cases.”111
B. Jury Trial
While today the right to the assistance of counsel is considered
the most valuable constitutional right of defendants,112 the right to
jury trial was “the most important to the Framers” of the
Constitution.113 Recognizing the importance of this right as early
as 1215, the Magna Carta declared that “[n]o free man shall be
taken or imprisoned [or dispossessed] or outlawed or exiled or in
any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers
and the law of the land.”114 The Declaration of Independence cited
British breaches of this right in prosecutions of colonists as cause
for separation: “depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of Trial
by Jury.”115 So important was the right to jury trial that the

before knowing anything about the case except the charge”).
109. Russell Christopher, Penalizing and Chilling an Indigent’s Exercise of
the Right to Appointed Counsel for Misdemeanors, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1905, 1908
(2014).
110. Id.
111. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 595.
112. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (“Of all the rights that an
accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.”
(quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1956))).
113. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1199
(6th ed. 2017).
114. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 29 (1215).
115. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 1776).
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Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to jury trial—twice.116
Article III states: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”117 And the Sixth Amendment
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”118
The Supreme Court, however, has long construed “all” crimes
and “all” prosecutions to mean only some.119 “It has long been
settled that ‘there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is
not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision.’”120
Beginning in 1888 in Callan v. Wilson,121 the Court has
unwaveringly limited the right to only non-petty or serious
offenses.122 In 1968, Duncan held that the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, but reaffirmed its application to only serious
offenses.123 Refusing to articulate a bright-line test distinguishing
between serious and petty offenses, the Court found an offense’s
maximum authorized punishment “of major relevance.”124 Terming
it the “most relevant” factor, Baldwin v. New York125 clarified that
offenses authorizing imprisonment exceeding six months
necessarily triggered the constitutional right to jury trial.126
116. See infra notes 117–118.
117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
119. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (noting “the
long-established view that so-called ‘petty offenses’ may be tried without a jury”).
120. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989) (quoting
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)).
121. 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
122. See id. at 557 (1888) (exempting from the constitutional right of trial by
jury “that class or grade of offenses called ‘petty offenses’”).
123. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (doubting “that there
is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth
Amendment jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment jury trial requirement here applied to the States” unless the crime
carries possible penalties up to six months).
124. See id. (deciding that the severity of the maximum authorized penalty is
most relevant in concluding whether an offense is petty and stating that a twoyear maximum is sufficiently ‘serious’ to require an opportunity for jury trial).
125. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
126. See id. at 68–69 (“[W]e have concluded that no offense can be deemed
‘petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than
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Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas127 ruled that offenses
authorizing maximum imprisonments of six months or less were
presumptively petty, not triggering the right to jury trial.128 On
behalf of proportionally allocating the right, Duncan, Baldwin, and
Blanton all offered the rationale of administrative efficiency
outweighing harm to defendants.129
III. Gideon, Scott, and Duncan Conflict with Other
Constitutional Rights
While Part I explained how any proportionally allocated right
has the enhanced potential to conflict with other constitutional
rights, this Part illustrates how this potential for conflict yields
actual conflicts. This Part demonstrates that Gideon conflicts with
eight constitutional rights; Scott and Duncan conflict with ten. For
reasons of economy, the scenarios depicting the conflicts combine
the rights of appointed counsel and jury trial. But they need not be
so combined; each right alone could cause the same conflicts. But
because the scenarios combine both rights, the defendant in each
example is indigent. While Gideon- and Scott-based conflicts apply
only to indigents (because the Gideon and Scott rights apply only
to indigents), Duncan-based conflicts could apply as well to
non-indigent defendants.
The conflicts arise in a variety of procedural contexts.
Defendants forego exercising constitutional rights to maintain,
and in other contexts to attain, the Sixth Amendment rights to
appointed counsel and jury trial. The conflicts arise when
six months is authorized.”).
127. 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
128. See id. at 543 (“Although we did not hold in Baldwin that an offense
carrying a maximum prison term of six months or less automatically qualifies as
a ‘petty’ offense, and decline to do so today, we do find it appropriate to
presume . . . society views such an offense as ‘petty.’”).
129. See id. at 542–43 (defending the disadvantages to defendants of nonjury
trials for petty offenses because they “may be outweighed by the benefits [to the
state] that result from speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications” (quoting
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73)); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (“[T]he possible consequences
to defendants from convictions of petty offenses have been thought insufficient to
outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial
administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury
adjudications.”).
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defendants are charged with single felonies, single misdemeanors,
multiple misdemeanors, and both felonies and misdemeanors.
Eight of the ten conflicts arise in multiple procedural contexts,
with most arising in four different procedural contexts. This wide
variety, when considering resolutions to the conflicts (as Part V
addresses), precludes the possibility of tailoring narrow,
context-based remedies.
For simplicity, suppose that each indigent in the following
scenarios depicting the conflicts, facing the dilemmatic choice of
which constitutional rights to exercise, opts to forego various
constitutional rights to ensure enjoyment of the rights to appointed
counsel and jury trial. Although which dilemmatic choice the
indigent makes and why is not necessarily relevant to whether the
rights conflict,130 it may nonetheless be helpful to understand the
practical reasons making such a choice plausible. First, as the
Supreme Court has stated, the assistance of counsel and jury trial
are the more valuable rights because they ensure the protection of,
support, and complement all the other rights.131 Second, expert
cross-examination by counsel will expose the shaky credibility of
prosecution witnesses, resulting in acquittal. Third, a jury, but not
a judge, will be sympathetic to the extenuating circumstances and
thus a jury, but not a judge, will deliver an acquittal. Each indigent
defendant concludes, for one or more of the above reasons, that she
is better off (as a way to minimize liability) by foregoing her
various constitutional rights to ensure enjoyment of her Sixth
Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial.
In many of the scenarios, the indigent foregoes the chance at
obtaining the dismissal of a more serious charge to ensure the
rights to appointed counsel and jury trial for that charge as well as
a less serious charge. One might object by claiming
implausibility—no rational defendant would so choose. But as
130. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 1987) (“If the
government forces a defendant to choose between constitutional rights, which
right the defendant surrenders does not alter the analysis.”); Strange v. James,
323 F. Supp. 1230, 1234 (D. Kan. 1971) (“[W]hether the accused in this case
accepted or rejected [appointed] counsel does not remove the fact that the
provision for recovering legal expenses is a burden and condition on the exercise
of the right to counsel and thereby has some chilling effect.”); Westen, supra note
49, at 757 n.49 (noting that whether two rights unconstitutionally conflict does
not “depend[] on how a defendant responds to the compelled election”).
131. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
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explained above, the indigent has several reasons for doing just
that. And there are three additional possible reasons rebutting
implausibility. First, the more serious charge is weak and likely to
result in acquittal even if the indigent declines to exercise a
constitutional right that might obtain its dismissal. Second,
without a jury trial and appointed counsel, conviction on the less
serious charge is likely; with a jury trial and appointed counsel,
acquittal of both charges is likely. Third, that a defendant
seemingly chooses irrationally is neither implausible nor
eliminates the conflict. For example, in Green v. United States,132
a defendant made a similar, seemingly unwise decision.133 Indicted
on capital murder and second-degree murder, the jury found Green
guilty of second-degree murder but was silent as to the capital
murder.134 Despite avoiding the death penalty and receiving a
comparatively light sentence of five to twenty years’
imprisonment,135 Green appealed the conviction thereby risking
relinquishing his right against double jeopardy and risking retrial
on the capital murder.136 After a successful appeal, Green was
retried under the original indictment but this time the jury
convicted on the capital murder and the defendant was sentenced
to death.137 Despite Green choosing seemingly unwisely by
“tak[ing] a ‘desperate chance’ in securing the reversal of the
erroneous [second degree murder] conviction,” the Court held that
the right to appeal and the right against double jeopardy
unconstitutionally conflicted.138 As to the defendant’s dilemmatic
choice between which right to exercise, the Court declared that
“[t]he law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the
defendant in such an incredible dilemma.”139

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

355 U.S. 184 (1957).
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id.
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A. Fifth Amendment Right Against Double Jeopardy

More expansively presenting an example briefly discussed
above,140 the following scenarios illustrate how Gideon and Duncan
conflict with the Fifth Amendment right against double
jeopardy.141 Suppose an indigent is charged with both a
misdemeanor (ineligible for appointed counsel and jury trial) and
a felony (for which Gideon and Duncan guarantee those rights).
Because the misdemeanor and felony arise out of the same act or
transaction, the indigent will be tried jointly142 before a jury,143 and
represented by appointed counsel, on both charges.144 The indigent
has a double jeopardy claim against only the felony.145 But she
140. See supra Part I. For examples of different unconstitutional conflicts
involving the Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy, see Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 186–93 (1957); United States v. Bounos, 693 F.2d
38, 39 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[D]efendants would not be waiving their Fifth Amendment
rights if they confessed guilt for the purpose of making out their double jeopardy
claim.” (citing decisions from the Third and Fifth Circuits)).
141. The double jeopardy clause prohibits subjecting a defendant “for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V,
§ 2.
142. See, e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 8(a) (authorizing joinder of offenses that are
“based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts
of a common scheme or plan”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 856 (“It is
commonly provided that offenses committed at the same time and place or
otherwise related to one another may be joined together so that the defendant
may be prosecuted for all of them in a single trial.”).
143. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-705(b-1) (2014) (“If a defendant in a criminal
case is charged with . . . at least one jury demandable offense and one non-jury
demandable offense, the trial for all offenses charged against that defendant shall
be by jury . . . .”); State v. Huebner, 505 A.2d 1331, 1335 (Md. 1986) (asserting
that because right to jury trial attached to one offense it also attached to all “other
offenses [that] arose out of the same circumstances”). But see LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 48, at 1072 (noting “the practice followed in some jurisdictions of sending
only the nonpetty offense to the jury and leaving the petty offense charge to be
determined by the judge”).
144. Though not a formal rule, it is common practice for reasons of economy
for an indigent charged with both a felony (constitutionally entitled to appointed
counsel) and a misdemeanor (unentitled to appointed counsel) to be represented
by appointed counsel on both charges. Interview with Jill Webb, Cmty. Res.
Coordinator, Tulsa Cty. Pub. Defender’s Office (Mar. 16, 2017); Interview with
Anonymous, Fed. Criminal Defense Practitioner on Fed. Pub. Defender’s Panel
(Mar. 3, 2017).
145. For example, the felony possibly constitutes the “same offense” for double
jeopardy purposes as a lesser offense for which the indigent was previously found
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realizes that by prevailing on the claim, the dismissal of the felony
would leave the sole charge of the misdemeanor affording neither
appointed counsel nor jury trial.146 (Alternatively, the indigent is
charged only with the felony. But she realizes that by prevailing
on the double jeopardy claim and obtaining dismissal of the felony,
the prosecutor will subsequently charge her with the misdemeanor
affording neither appointed counsel nor jury trial).
The following scenarios depict Scott and Duncan causing a
similar conflict. Suppose an indigent is charged with two
misdemeanors (Misdemeanors A and B). Misdemeanor A is eligible
for appointed counsel under Scott and guarantees a right to jury
trial under Duncan but Misdemeanor B is eligible for neither.
Based on Misdemeanor A, the indigent receives a jury trial and
appointed counsel.147 Because both misdemeanors arise out of the
same act or transaction, the indigent will be jointly tried before a
jury, and represented by appointed counsel, on both charges.148
The indigent has a double jeopardy claim against only
Misdemeanor A. But the indigent realizes that by prevailing on the
double jeopardy claim, the dismissal of Misdemeanor A would
leave the sole charge of Misdemeanor B affording neither
appointed counsel nor jury trial.149 (Alternatively, the indigent is
charged only with Misdemeanor A. She realizes that by prevailing
on the double jeopardy claim and obtaining dismissal of
Misdemeanor A, the prosecutor will subsequently charge her with
guilty and punished. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (“The
same-elements test, sometimes referred to as the ‘Blockburger’ test, inquires
whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they
are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and
successive prosecution.”). Prosecution of a crime following the punishment of a
lesser-included offense arising out of the same incident violates double jeopardy.
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment [Double
Jeopardy Clause] forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for
a greater and lesser included offense.”).
146. A double jeopardy claim may be applicable to one charge but not another
because there is no mandatory “same transaction” joinder protection under the
Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 48, at 884 (“[A] majority of the Court has refused to accept the ‘same
transaction’ test as a constitutional imperative.” (citing Brown, 432 U.S. at 169)).
147. See supra notes 104–111, 119–128 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
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Misdemeanor B affording neither appointed counsel nor jury
trial.)150
In each of the above scenarios, the indigent faces the following
dilemma. Exercising her Fifth Amendment right against double
jeopardy risks loss of her Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial and
appointed counsel.151 Ensuring appointed counsel and jury trial
requires foregoing her Fifth Amendment right.152 Gideon, Scott,
and Duncan compel the indigent to choose between her Sixth
Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial, and her
Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy.153 Because
enjoying her Sixth Amendment rights may require foregoing her
Fifth Amendment right and vice-versa, the rights conflict.
B. Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Right
Rather than maintain, the following conflict involves a
defendant seeking to attain appointed counsel and jury trial. The
conflict is between Gideon and Duncan, and the Sixth Amendment
speedy trial right.154 Suppose a judge informs an indigent charged
with a misdemeanor ineligible for jury trial but eligible for
appointed counsel that she is initially inclined to not appoint
counsel. But the judge offers to revisit the issue as the prosecution
develops additional evidence. Hoping to obtain sufficient
additional evidence to increase the charge to a felony,155 the
150. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
151. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing the right to a trial “by an impartial
jury” and the right to “Assistance of Counsel”).
152. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”).
153. See supra notes 141–150 and accompanying text.
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.”).
155. A prosecutor is generally free to increase (or decrease) the number and
severity of charges against a defendant before trial begins. See, e.g., United States
v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382 (1982)
A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise . . . broad
discretion . . . to determine the extent of . . . prosecution. An initial
decision should not freeze future conduct . . . . [T]he initial charges
filed by a prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual
is legitimately subject to prosecution.
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prosecutor repeatedly requests continuances that delays
commencement of the trial for years. The indigent would like to
object to the continuances as violating his right to a speedy trial.156
But he would also like to obtain a jury trial and appointed counsel
(for which he would be constitutionally entitled if charged with the
felony). He realizes that by prevailing on the objection, the judge
will not grant the prosecution the continuances, the prosecution
will not muster additional evidence to increase the charge, and
thus he will not become entitled to appointed counsel and jury
trial.157 (A similar conflict could arise through Scott and
Duncan.158) The indigent faces the dilemma of a forced choice
between the Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and
jury trial, and the right to a speedy trial. Because enjoying the
Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial may
require foregoing his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and
vice-versa, the rights conflict.
C. Due Process Clause Right Against Vindictive Prosecution
In the following scenario, Gideon and Duncan conflict with the
Due Process Clause right against vindictive prosecution.159
Suppose an indigent is charged with a misdemeanor triggering
neither appointed counsel nor jury trial. During the unsuccessful
156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text.
158. Suppose the prosecutor repeatedly requests continuances to develop
additional evidence allowing an increase in the charge to a more serious
misdemeanor (constitutionally entitled to jury trial and eligible for appointed
counsel) from a less serious misdemeanor (affording neither). See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him.”); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 367 (1979) (“The Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to assistance of
appointed counsel in his defense.”). The indigent realizes that prevailing on the
Sixth Amendment speedy trial right claim precludes the prosecution from
increasing the charge and thus prevents him from enjoying appointed counsel and
a jury trial. See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text.
159. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
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plea negotiations, the prosecutor never mentions the possibility of
an additional, increased charge if the indigent declines to plead
guilty. Informing the indigent that “I’m sending a message to you
and other defendants who refuse to plea bargain,” the prosecutor
adds a felony charge (constitutionally entitling the indigent to
appointed counsel and jury trial).160 Being jointly tried on both
charges, the indigent receives appointed counsel and jury trial for
both.161 Because the prosecutor never mentioned the additional,
increased charge during the negotiations and the prosecutor’s
statement arguably evidences a motive of vindictiveness, the
indigent has a due process claim for prosecutorial
vindictiveness.162 But prevailing on the claim would result in
dismissal of the felony and thus loss of the rights to appointed
counsel and jury trial.163 (A similar conflict could arise through
Scott and Duncan.164) The indigent faces the dilemma of having to
choose between the Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel
and jury trial, and the due process right. Because enjoying her
Sixth Amendment rights may require foregoing her Due Process
right and vice-versa, the rights conflict.

160. See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
162. Generally, a prosecutor carrying out a threat made during plea
negotiations to increase charges if the defendant refuses to plead guilty does not
constitute prosecutorial vindictiveness violating due process. See Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (describing such threats as “‘an
inevitable’—and permissible—‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates
and encourages the negotiation of pleas’”). However, Bordenkircher explicitly
exempted from its ruling the situation, as here, “where the prosecutor without
notice brought an additional and more serious charge after plea
negotiations . . . had ended with the defendant’s insistence on not pleading
guilty.” Id. at 360.
163. See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text.
164. Suppose the prosecutor, with the same arguably vindictive motive, adds
an additional, more serious misdemeanor charge (constitutionally entitled to jury
trial and eligible for appointed counsel). See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying
text. The judge appoints counsel and schedules a jury trial. Being jointly tried on
both charges, the indigent receives jury trial and representation by appointed
counsel on both charges. See supra notes 142–144. Prevailing on the prosecutorial
vindictiveness claim would result in dismissal of the more serious misdemeanor
thereby triggering loss of the rights to appointed counsel and jury trial.
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D. Due Process Clause Right to Discovery
Gideon and Duncan conflict with the Due Process Clause165
right to discovery of exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor’s
possession.166 Suppose an indigent is charged with a felony
(constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel and jury trial).167 He
knows that the prosecutor possesses strong exculpatory evidence.
However, “[t]he prosecutor’s constitutional obligation is not
violated, notwithstanding the nondisclosure of apparently
exculpatory evidence, where the evidence was known to the
defense and no request for disclosure was made.”168 The indigent
realizes that asserting his discovery rights would cause the
prosecutor to dismiss the felony but subsequently charge a
misdemeanor (constitutionally eligible for neither appointed
counsel nor jury trial) for which there is no exculpatory evidence.
(Similar conflicts may arise in alternative procedural contexts169
and through Scott and Duncan170 as well as Scott alone.171) The
165. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
166. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
167. See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text.
168. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 1145.
169. Alternatively, suppose the indigent is charged with both a felony
(constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel and jury trial) and a misdemeanor
(affording neither). See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text. Being
jointly tried on both charges, he receives appointed counsel and a jury trial on
both charges. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text. He knows that
there is strong exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor’s possession only on the
felony. He realizes that exercising his discovery rights risks both dismissal of the
felony and loss of rights to appointed counsel and jury trial. See supra notes 5–11
and accompanying text.
170. Suppose the indigent is charged with a misdemeanor (constitutionally
entitled to jury trial and eligible for appointed counsel). See supra notes 7–11 and
accompanying text. He realizes that exercising his discovery rights would cause
the prosecutor to dismiss the misdemeanor and subsequently charge a less
serious misdemeanor (constitutionally ineligible for appointed counsel and jury
trial) for which there is no exculpatory evidence. See supra notes 7–11 and
accompanying text.
171. Suppose the indigent is charged with a misdemeanor eligible for
appointed counsel. Thinking that imprisonment is unlikely, the judge declines to
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indigent faces the dilemma of having to choose between his Sixth
Amendment rights, and his Due Process Clause right. Because
enjoying those Sixth Amendment rights may require foregoing his
Due Process Clause right and vice-versa, those rights conflict.
E. Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Gideon and Duncan conflict with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.172 Suppose an indigent is
charged with both a felony (constitutionally entitled to appointed
counsel and jury trial) and a misdemeanor (affording neither).173
Being jointly tried on both charges, she receives appointed counsel
and a jury trial on both.174 She has a possible Fifth Amendment
claim against only the felony on the basis that her confession was
coerced and involuntary.175 But she realizes that prevailing on the
claim would trigger dismissal of the felony and thus loss of the
rights to appointed counsel and jury trial.176 (Similar conflicts arise
in alternative procedural contexts177 and through Scott and

appoint counsel but states that as more evidence comes to light she will revisit
the issue. The indigent knows that there is some exculpatory evidence in the
possession of the prosecution. But he also realizes that discovery and disclosure
of this exculpatory information would dissuade the judge from appointing
counsel.
172. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”).
173. See, e.g., supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (finding that
admission into evidence of a confession not “free and voluntary” violated the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
176. See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text.
177. Alternatively, the indigent is only charged with the felony. She realizes
that prevailing on the Fifth Amendment claim would cause the dismissal of the
felony but that the prosecutor would subsequently charge a misdemeanor
(constitutionally ineligible for appointed counsel and jury trial) not subject to a
Fifth Amendment claim. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
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Duncan178 as well as Scott alone.179) The indigent faces the
dilemma of having to choose between the Sixth Amendment rights
to appointed counsel and jury trial, and the Fifth Amendment
privilege. Because enjoying her Sixth Amendment rights may
require foregoing her Fifth Amendment right and vice-versa, those
rights conflict.
F. Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause Right
Gideon and Duncan conflict with the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause right to confront adverse witnesses.180
Suppose an indigent is charged with a felony (constitutionally
entitled to appointed counsel and jury trial).181 The prosecution’s
case rests largely on the admissibility of a co-defendant’s out of
court confession incriminating the indigent. Because the
co-defendant will not be testifying at trial, there will be no
178. Suppose an indigent is charged with both a serious misdemeanor
(constitutionally entitled to jury trial and eligible for appointed counsel) and a
less serious misdemeanor (eligible for neither). Being jointly tried on both
charges, she receives appointed counsel and a jury trial on both charges. See supra
notes 142–144 and accompanying text. She has a possible Fifth Amendment claim
against only the more serious misdemeanor. But she realizes that prevailing on
the claim would cause the dismissal of the more serious misdemeanor and the
loss of the rights to appointed counsel and jury trial. See supra notes 7–11 and
accompanying text. Alternatively, she is only charged with the more serious
misdemeanor. She realizes that by prevailing on the Fifth Amendment claim, the
prosecutor would subsequently charge the less serious misdemeanor
(constitutionally ineligible for appointed counsel and jury trial) not subject to a
Fifth Amendment claim. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
179. Suppose an indigent is charged with a misdemeanor eligible for
appointed counsel but ineligible for jury trial. The indigent has a considerable
interest in not self-incriminating before the judge deciding issues of both guilt
and punishment. But the indigent realizes that by making self-incriminating
statements she might be able to persuade the judge that imposition of
imprisonment is sufficiently likely as to warrant appointment of counsel under
Scott. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 367 (1979) (providing that an indigent
defendant must have or waive appointed counsel in order to be incarcerated).
Obtaining appointed counsel may require foregoing the privilege; exercising the
privilege risks foregoing appointed counsel.
180. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).
181. See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text.

734

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 703 (2018)

opportunity for cross-examination.182 Introduction of a
co-defendant’s incriminating confession, without opportunity for
cross-examination, violates the Confrontation Clause.183 The
indigent realizes that prevailing on his Confrontation Clause claim
would cause the prosecutor to dismiss the felony but replace it with
a misdemeanor neither subject to the claim nor constitutionally
eligible for appointed counsel and jury trial.184 (Similar conflicts
arise in alternative procedural contexts185 and through Scott and
Duncan.186) The indigent faces the dilemma of having to choose
between the Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and
jury trial, and the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
182. See Cross-examination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(explaining that “cross-examination” is “[t]he questioning of a witness at a trial
or hearing by the party opposed to the party in whose favor the witness has
testified”).
183. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987) (“[W]here a nontestifying
codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible
against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint
trial.”); see also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968) (finding a
Confrontation Clause violation despite the judge issuing a limiting instruction
that the jury not consider the confession as evidence of guilt of the non-confessing
co-defendant).
184. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
185. Alternatively, the indigent is charged with both a felony (constitutionally
entitled to appointed counsel and jury trial) and a misdemeanor (eligible for
neither). See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text. Being jointly tried on both
charges, he receives appointed counsel and a jury trial on both charges. See supra
notes 142–144 and accompanying text. He realizes that by prevailing on the
Confrontation Clause claim, the dismissal of the felony would trigger loss of the
rights to appointed counsel and jury trial.
186. Suppose the indigent is charged with both a serious misdemeanor
(constitutionally entitled to jury trial and eligible for appointed counsel) and a
less serious misdemeanor (eligible for neither). See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 157–58 (1968) (“Our conclusion is that in the American States, as in the
Federal Judicial System, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a
fundamental right . . . .”). He realizes that prevailing on the Confrontation Clause
claim would cause the dismissal of the more serious misdemeanor and the loss of
rights to appointed counsel and jury trial. See id. at 159 (explaining that “[c]rimes
carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they
otherwise qualify as petty offenses”). Alternatively, the indigent is only charged
with the more serious misdemeanor. But he realizes that by prevailing on the
Confrontation Clause claim, the prosecutor will subsequently charge a less
serious misdemeanor (constitutionally ineligible for appointed counsel and jury
trial) not subject to the claim. Id.
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Because enjoying his former rights may require foregoing his latter
right and vice-versa, those rights conflict.
G. Eighth Amendment Right Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Gideon and Duncan conflict with the Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment.187 Suppose that an
indigent is being tried jointly for a felony (constitutionally
guaranteeing appointed counsel and jury trial) and a misdemeanor
(eligible for neither).188 Based on the felony, the defendant receives
appointed counsel for and a jury trial on both charges.189 The felony
(but not the misdemeanor) arguably unconstitutionally
criminalizes her status as a drug addict based on the decision of
Robinson v. California.190 In Robinson, the Court held that an
offense criminalizing the status of being addicted to drugs, without
requiring some affirmative conduct, violated the Eighth
Amendment’s
prohibition
against
cruel
and
unusual
191
punishment.
But the indigent realizes that prevailing on the
Eighth Amendment claim and obtaining a dismissal of the felony
would trigger loss of her rights to appointed counsel and jury
trial.192 (Similar conflicts arise in alternative procedural
contexts193 and through Scott and Duncan.194) She faces the
187. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”).
188. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157–58 (providing that the right to a jury trial
is required for defendants charged with serious offenses).
189. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
190. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
191. See id. at 667 (holding that “a state law which imprisons a person thus
afflicted as a criminal . . . inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment”).
192. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
193. Alternatively, the indigent is charged with the felony alone. She realizes
that by prevailing on the Eighth Amendment claim and obtaining dismissal of the
felony, the prosecutor would subsequently file the misdemeanor charge not
subject to the Eighth Amendment claim and ineligible for appointed counsel and
jury trial. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
194. Suppose that the indigent is being tried jointly for a comparatively
serious misdemeanor (constitutionally entitled to jury trial and eligible for
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dilemma of having to choose between the Sixth Amendment rights
to appointed counsel and jury trial, and the Eighth Amendment
right. Because enjoying her Sixth Amendment rights may require
foregoing her Eighth Amendment right and vice-versa, those
rights conflict.
H. Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures
Gideon and Duncan conflict with the Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.195 Suppose an
indigent is charged with a felony (constitutionally entitled to
appointed counsel and jury trial) supported by evidence obtained
through an arguably illegal search and seizure. The indigent
realizes that by raising a Fourth Amendment objection, the
prosecution would dismiss the felony to avoid risking losing a
suppression hearing but would replace it with a misdemeanor
neither subject to a Fourth Amendment claim nor eligible for
appointed counsel and jury trial. (Similar conflicts arise in
alternative procedural contexts196 and through Scott and
appointed counsel) and a less serious misdemeanor (affording neither). See supra
notes 7–11 and accompanying text. Being jointly tried, she receives appointed
counsel and a jury trial on both charges. She has a possible Eighth Amendment
claim against only the more serious misdemeanor. But she realizes that
prevailing on the Eighth Amendment claim and obtaining a dismissal of the more
serious misdemeanor would trigger loss of the rights to appointed counsel and
jury trial. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the
prosecutor charges only the more serious misdemeanor. The indigent realizes that
by prevailing on the Eighth Amendment claim and obtaining dismissal of the
misdemeanor, the prosecutor would subsequently charge a less serious
misdemeanor neither subject to the claim nor constitutionally eligible for
appointed counsel and jury trial. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
195. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, homes, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.”). For an example of a different unconstitutional conflict
involving the Fourth Amendment, see infra note 247 and accompanying text.
196. Alternatively, the indigent is charged with the felony and the
misdemeanor. Based on the felony, he receives appointed counsel and jury trial
for both charges. See supra notes 5–6, 9–11 and accompanying text. He realizes
that raising the Fourth Amendment objection might cause dismissal of the felony
leaving the misdemeanor (constitutionally entitled to neither appointed counsel
nor jury trial). See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968) (providing
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Duncan.197) The indigent faces the dilemma of a forced choice
between his Sixth Amendment rights and his Fourth Amendment
right. Because enjoying his Sixth Amendment rights may require
foregoing his Fourth Amendment right and vice-versa, those rights
conflict.

the right to jury trial for crimes with serious punishments).
Alternatively, the indigent is charged with only the misdemeanor. But he
realizes that once the prosecution fully assesses all of the evidence (obtained
through an arguably illegal search and seizure), the prosecution would add the
felony. Because the indigent would be tried jointly on both charges, the indigent
would receive appointed counsel and jury trial on both charges. The indigent also
realizes that raising a Fourth Amendment objection might cause dismissal of the
felony and the loss of appointed counsel and jury trial. See supra notes 7–11 and
accompanying text.
197. Suppose the indigent has thus far only been charged with a misdemeanor
constitutionally ineligible for appointed counsel and jury trial. But he realizes
that after the prosecution fully assesses all of the evidence (obtained through an
arguably illegal search and seizure), the prosecution will add a more serious
misdemeanor charge constitutionally entitled to jury trial and eligible for
appointed counsel. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968) (stating
that “a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right”).
Because the indigent would be jointly tried on both charges, he would receive
appointed counsel and jury trial on both charges. See supra notes 142–144 and
accompanying text. He also realizes that raising a Fourth Amendment objection
would deter the prosecution from adding the more serious misdemeanor charge
and preclude attainment of appointed counsel and jury trial. See Duncan, 391
U.S. at 158 (“Thus we hold no constitutional doubts about the
practices . . . prosecuting petty crimes without extending a right to a jury trial.”).
Alternatively, the indigent is charged with both misdemeanors. Based on the
more serious misdemeanor, the indigent receives appointed counsel and a jury
trial for both charges. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text. He
realizes that raising a Fourth Amendment objection might cause dismissal of the
more serious misdemeanor leaving the less serious misdemeanor that is
constitutionally entitled to neither appointed counsel nor jury trial. See Duncan,
391 U.S. at 159 (explaining that crimes without severe punishments, including
long periods of incarceration, are not automatically entitled to a trial by jury).
Alternatively, the indigent is charged with only the more serious misdemeanor.
He realizes that raising a Fourth Amendment objection might cause dismissal of
the more serious misdemeanor but the prosecutor would subsequently charge the
less serious misdemeanor neither subject to a Fourth Amendment objection nor
constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel and jury trial. Id.
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I. Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Duncan and Scott conflict with the Sixth Amendment right to
the effective assistance of counsel.198 Suppose indigent A and her
five indigent co-defendants are charged with various
misdemeanors rendering them all constitutionally eligible for
appointed counsel and, except for A, entitled to a jury trial. Though
the likelihood of imprisonment being imposed is not sufficient to
warrant appointment of counsel under Scott for some of the six
co-defendants, the judge appoints counsel to represent all six
because of the cost savings.199 For similar reasons of
“administrative convenience[],” all six co-defendants are to be
jointly tried before a jury.200 A is concerned that her co-defendants’
testimony will incriminate her and requests that her appointed
counsel discredit their testimony on cross-examination. The
appointed counsel explains that any cross-examination will be
limited because he is their attorney as well and would have a
conflict of interest.201 The counsel offers to raise the conflict of
interest to the judge, explaining that joint representation of
multiple defendants where the counsel has a conflict of interest
may constitute a violation of A’s Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.202 The Supreme Court ruled, in

198. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (“The Sixth
Amendment ‘right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel . . . .’” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))).
For an example of a different unconstitutional conflict involving the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, see infra note 205 and
accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text.
200. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
201. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(“A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties’
testimony, incompatibility in position in relation to an opposing party or the fact
that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or
liabilities in question.”).
202. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978) (“This Court held
that ‘the Assistance of Counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court
order requiring that one lawyer should simultaneously represent conflicting
interests.’” (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942))).
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Holloway v. Arkansas,203 that if the judge fails to hold a hearing,
upon being informed of the conflict, the defendant is entitled to an
automatic reversal of any conviction.204 But if the judge holds a
hearing and finds a conflict, the judge might well sever A from her
co-defendants and remove her to a bench trial without appointed
counsel.205 The indigent faces the dilemma of having to choose
between enjoying appointed counsel and jury trial, and the full
enjoyment of her Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free effective
assistance of counsel.206 Because enjoying appointed counsel and
jury trial may require foregoing her right to conflict-free effective
assistance of counsel and vice-versa, they conflict.
J. Due Process Clause Right to Testify in Own Defense
Duncan and Scott conflict with the Due Process Clause207 right
to testify in one’s own defense.208 Consider the situation above
except that none of A’s five co-defendants plan on testifying. A,
however, wishes to testify. Agreeing it would aid her individual
defense, the appointed counsel representing all six co-defendants
cautions that if only she testifies that will “undoubtedly highlight
203. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
204. See id. at 488 (“[W]henever a trial court improperly requires joint
representation over timely objection reversal is automatic.”).
205. See United States v. Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. 485, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(“The question of severance must be decided in the discretion of the trial judge
whose determination will not be upset in the absence of an abuse of such
discretion.”).
206. Though losing the right to an automatic reversal, the defendant would
not entirely lose her right to effective assistance of counsel even if the conflict
were not brought to the court’s attention. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162,
168 (2002) (“[A]bsent objection, a defendant must demonstrate that ‘a conflict of
interest actually affected the adequacy of this representation.’” (quoting Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348–49 (1980))).
207. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
208. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51–53 (1987) (basing the
constitutional right to testify in one’s own defense, in part, on the Due Process
Clause); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (ruling that denial of
defendant’s right to testify in his own defense violated due process). For an
example of a different unconstitutional conflict involving the due process right to
testify, see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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the lack of testimony from the other[s]” thereby undermining the
defense of the five co-defendants.209 On this basis, the appointed
counsel is reluctant to let her testify. After A insists, the appointed
counsel offers to raise the matter with the court but cautions that
the remedy might be to sever her case and try her in a bench trial
without appointed counsel.210 The indigent faces the dilemma of
having to choose between enjoying appointed counsel and jury
trial, and the Due Process Clause right. Because enjoying
appointed counsel and jury trial may require foregoing her right to
testify and vice-versa, they conflict.
IV. Four Bases for the Conflicts’ Unconstitutionality
This Part argues that the conflicts between Gideon, Scott, and
Duncan and ten other constitutional rights are unconstitutional on
four independent bases. First, burdening, penalizing, chilling, or
deterring a right is unconstitutional.211 Second, coercing
defendants to relinquish one constitutional right in order to
exercise another is unconstitutional.212 Sometimes conflated and
sometimes distinguished, these two bases fall under a variety of
terms, including a “Hobson’s choice,”213 “incredible dilemma,”214
“Catch-22,”215 and a “compelled election.”216 Some courts and
209. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 646.
210. See Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. at 490 (explaining that the judge has the
discretion to sever a defendant under these circumstances).
211. See infra note 217.
212. See infra notes 254–259 and accompanying text.
213. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 279 (1998); United
States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Khan, 309
F. Supp. 2d 789, 799 (E.D. Va. 2004). For the origin and meaning of the phrase,
see Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 813 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The phrase comes from
Thomas Hobson, an English liveryman who required every customer to choose
the horse nearest the door . . . . A Hobson’s choice is thus an apparently free
choice when there is no real alternative.”).
214. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 746 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
215. Stuard v. Stewart, 401 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).
216. Peggy L. Hicks, Note, Compelled Election Between Constitutional Rights
in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 327, 327 (1987); Note,
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commentators refer to both bases as aspects of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine,217 some only one,218 and some
distinguish the doctrine from both.219 For clarity, the first basis
will be referred to as the Jackson principle220 and the second as the
Simmons principle.221 Third, disparities between the full
enjoyment of constitutional rights by non-indigents and their
compromised, or entirely nullified, enjoyment by indigents violates
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. And
fourth, such disparities violate the equality component of the Due
Process Clause. Because courts often intertwine their analysis of
equal protection and due process with respect to indigents’ rights,
these two will be analyzed together. All four bases apply to the
conflicts triggered by Gideon; only the first, third, and fourth bases
apply to conflicts caused by Scott; and, only the first two apply to
United States v. Dohm and the Compelled Election Between the Right to Remain
Silent and the Right to Reasonable Bail, 94 HARV. L. REV. 426, 426 (1980).
217. See United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1461 (7th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that “[t]his doctrine . . . prohibits the government from forcing a
defendant
to
choose
between
two
constitutionally
protected
rights . . . . Additionally, a defendant may not be penalized for asserting a
constitutional right”); United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating the same); Westen, supra note 49, at 753 (“Instead of involving one
constitutional condition, Simmons involved two constitutional conditions . . . .”);
Melanie D. Wilson, The Price of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford to Keep Our
Fourth Amendment Rights?, 92 IOWA L. REV. 159, 201–04 (2006) (explaining that
the approach taken in Simmons remains valid). For an explanation of the
doctrine, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (“[It] holds that government may not grant a benefit on
the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government may withhold that benefit altogether. It reflects the triumph of the
view that government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly.”).
218. See Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178, 1189 (6th Cir.
1997), rev’d on other grounds, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (distinguishing Simmons from
both unconstitutional conditions and difficult choices involving only one
constitutional right); United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 1991)
(distinguishing both Simmons and unconstitutional conditions doctrine from
difficult choices involving only one constitutional right).
219. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1968)
(distinguishing between forgoing a constitutional right to obtain another
constitutional right and merely to obtain a benefit); Tomai-Minogue v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1228, 1232 n.6 (4th Cir. 1985) (same).
220. See infra notes 222–227 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 251–259 and accompanying text.
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Duncan-based conflicts. While no basis is dispositive, this Part
argues that each basis persuasively establishes the
unconstitutionality of the conflicts. Furthermore, each of these
four bases is independent. That is, even if the conflicts are deemed
constitutional under one basis, nonetheless they might qualify as
unconstitutional under one or more of the other bases. Finally, this
Part anticipates, presents, and rebuts five possible objections to
the central claim that Gideon, Scott, and Duncan
unconstitutionally conflict with ten other constitutional rights.
A. Burdening, Penalizing, Chilling, and Deterring Rights
A general principle of constitutional law is that burdening,
penalizing, chilling, or deterring exercise of a constitutional right
is unconstitutional.222 “[I]t is well settled that a statutory provision
that conditions and thereby deters the exercise of constitutional
rights may for that reason be unconstitutional.”223 As the Supreme
Court explained, “[t]here are rights of constitutional stature whose
exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.”224 In
perhaps the leading decision employing the principle, the Court in
United States v. Jackson invalidated a statute that authorized
capital punishment only through a jury trial (but not a bench trial)
because it “impose[d] an impermissible burden upon the exercise
of a constitutional right”225 by “deter[ring] exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial.”226 The statute was
“unconstitutional because it makes ‘the risk of death’ the price for
asserting the right to jury trial, and thereby ‘impairs . . . free
exercise’ of that constitutional right.”227
Addressing how proportional rights—the greater the jeopardy,
the greater the procedural protections—may burden or deter
constitutional rights, Jackson is particularly instructive as applied
222. See supra note 217.
223. Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (D. Kan. 1971).
224. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
225. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968).
226. Id. at 581.
227. Id. at 571 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D.
Conn. 1967)).
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to the conflicts caused by Gideon, Scott, and Duncan. Just as the
statute invalidated by Jackson required greater procedural
protections (a jury trial) for a more severe punishment (capital
punishment),228 so also Gideon, Scott, and Duncan afford greater
procedural protections (appointed counsel and jury trial) for more
serious charges and punishment (felonies, misdemeanors resulting
in imprisonment, and serious offenses, respectively).229 Just as the
statute in Jackson unconstitutionally burdened and deterred
exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, so also Gideon,
Scott, and Duncan unconstitutionally burden and deter
defendants’ exercise of ten constitutional rights (as seen in Part
III).230 Note that both the invalidated statute in Jackson and the
holdings of Gideon, Scott, and Duncan all share the arguably
laudable purpose of providing heightened procedural protections
as offense and punishment severity increase. Nonetheless,
Jackson explained that the coercive effect “cannot be justified by
its ostensible purpose,” however legitimate or laudable.231
Therefore, Gideon, Scott, and Duncan’s arguably laudable
purpose—heightened procedural protections for more serious
consequences—also fails to justify its pernicious effect of
burdening and deterring the exercise of other constitutional rights.
The Jackson principle, however, is inconsistently applied.232
Despite finding the burdening or deterring of constitutional rights
to be “inevitable” in plea-bargaining,233 the Court has repeatedly
Attempting
to
defend
upheld
its
constitutionality.234
228. Id. at 572.
229. See supra Part II.
230. See supra Part III.
231. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582–83.
232. Compare North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) (ruling that
greater punishment following reconviction of defendants after receiving a new
trial following a successful appeal violated due process by “unconstitutionally
deter[ring] a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal”), with Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33–34 n.21 (1978) (conceding that such greater
punishment did burden and penalize the right to appeal but was nonetheless
constitutional because the coercive “effect cannot be said to be ‘needless’” (quoting
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583)).
233. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 31.
234. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“[I]t is
well settled that plea bargaining does not violate the Constitution even though a
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plea-bargaining, the Court emphasized that “not every burden on
the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or
encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.”235 Apart from
plea-bargaining, “the Supreme Court has prohibited states from
unduly encouraging defendants to forego their constitutional
rights in other contexts.”236 One such context is the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; the Court has
repeatedly found burdening that right unconstitutional.237 For
example, in Griffin v. California,238 the Court found that a trial
court’s negative comment to the jury about the defendant’s failure
to testify unconstitutionally burdened the Fifth Amendment
privilege.239 The trial court’s negative comment “is a penalty
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.”240
Despite some inconsistency,241 the “[l]ower courts continue to
apply Jackson” to find unconstitutional the burdening, chilling,
guilty plea waives important constitutional rights.”).
235. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978); accord LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 48, at 1009 (“It appears that the Court was influenced to some degree
by a perceived need to reach a result not casting doubts upon the plea negotiation
process.”).
236. Case Notes, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 60, 73
(1979).
237. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (finding that
adverse inferences drawn by the judge from defendant’s silence during sentencing
hearings unconstitutionally chilled the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (plurality
opinion) (holding that threat of disbarment unconstitutionally burdened Fifth
Amendment privilege); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (ruling
that termination of employment unconstitutionally penalized exercise of Fifth
Amendment privilege).
238. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
239. See id. at 615 (holding “that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct
application to the Federal Government and its bearing on the states by reason of
the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the
accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt”).
240. Id. at 614.
241. See, e.g., Howard E. Abrams, Systemic Coercion: Unconstitutional
Conditions in the Criminal Law, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128, 132 (1981)
(“[T]he Court has not formulated or consistently applied a coherent
theory . . . . This inability . . . has left the lower courts to reconcile inconsistent
holdings and produced myriad rationales and resolutions.”); Jason Mazzone, The
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deterring and penalizing of a wide variety of rights.242 Citing
Jackson, a federal court ruled that requiring indigents to repay the
state for the cost of appointed counsel unconstitutionally burdened
and deterred indigents’ exercise of their Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel.243 The First and Second Circuits held that
conditioning receipt of an acceptance of responsibility reduction in
sentence on defendants making incriminating statements as to
offenses outside their plea agreement unconstitutionally penalized
the free exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.244 In 1994, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a
burden imposed on the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial: “As
Jackson ruled that a defendant cannot trade his right to a jury trial
to safeguard his life, neither can he barter away his rights to
protect his liberty. We conclude that a jury waiver based on an
impermissible agreement to remain free on bail must be held
invalid.”245 In 2001, the Eighth Circuit found the prosecution’s
negative comments to the jury unconstitutionally burdened and
penalized the defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment rights
to jury trial and to confront witnesses.246 In 2006, the Ninth Circuit
invalidated a warrantless search based on the defendant’s consent
where pretrial release was conditioned on waiver of the
Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 801 (2003) (“[O]ur answer to the question
of whether individuals can exchange constitutional rights for government benefits
[or other constitutional rights] remains quite arbitrary.”).
242. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 1010.
243. See Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230, 1232–34 (D. Kan. 1971) (noting
that the burden was particularly unconstitutional given that it was “financial and
applie[d] unevenly to indigents”).
244. See United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 626 (2d Cir. 1990)
(explaining that “[j]ust because the government has agreed to dismiss counts does
not remove the risk of self-incrimination posed by admissions made by a
defendant . . . concerning crimes for which he is not pleading guilty”); United
States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Supreme Court
repeatedly has made it quite clear that the government cannot impose penalties
because a person elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give
incriminating testimony against himself.”).
245. United States v. Mitchell, No. 06-40335, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 43410,
at *16 (5th Cir. 1994).
246. See Burns v. Gammon, 260 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The
prosecution cannot use the defendant’s exercise of specific fundamental
constitutional guarantees against him at trial.”).
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defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.247 Finally, in 2010, citing
Jackson, the Second Circuit held the prosecutor’s argument to the
jury—that by opting for trial the defendant was not entitled to an
acceptance
of
responsibility
reduction
in
sentence—
“unconstitutionally burdened his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.”248 Based on Jackson and the above cases applying the
Jackson principle, the conflicts between Gideon, Scott, and Duncan
and ten other constitutional rights, as depicted in Part III, are
unconstitutional.
B. Coercing Relinquishment of Some Rights to Exercise Others
A second basis for the unconstitutionality of the conflicts,
applying to all eight Gideon249 and all ten Duncan-based
conflicts,250 is the general principle that coercing defendants to
forego one constitutional right in order to exercise another is
unconstitutional.251 As a leading treatise articulates it, a
“defendant should not be forced to relinquish one constitutional
right to obtain another.”252 The rationale is as follows: “A
defendant . . . is entitled to certain rights and protections. . . . He
is entitled to all of them; he cannot be forced to barter one for
247. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 865 n.4, 866–68, 875 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding “as matter of first impression, warrantless searches . . . imposed
as a condition of pretrial release, required showing of probable cause, despite
defendant’s pre-release consent”).
248. United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 194 (2d Cir. 2010).
249. See supra Part III.A–H.
250. Because this basis requires two conflicting constitutional rights, it may
not apply to the Scott-based conflicts. In some sense, the Scott right to appointed
counsel is only a conditional (conditioned on imprisonment being imposed)
constitutional right. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (explaining the
analysis used to determine whether a defendant is entitled to the right to receive
counsel).
251. See, e.g., Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 1978) (“As a
general proposition, the courts do not favor procedural rules which require an
individual to sacrifice one constitutional right as the price of preserving
another.”). The origin of the principle may stem from Green v. United States. See
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957) (“The law should not, and in our
judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incredible dilemma [of choosing
between constitutional rights].”).
252. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 608.
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another. When the exercise of one right is made contingent on the
forbearance of another, both rights are corrupted.”253 The leading
case applying this principle is Simmons v. United States, involving
conflicting Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.254 Establishing
eligibility for the defendant’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable
search and seizure claim required establishing standing.255
Establishing standing required the defendant to testify that the
incriminating seized items were his possessions.256 Because his
self-incriminating testimony could be admissible against him at
trial,257 the defendant faced the following dilemma: exercise his
Fourth Amendment right at the possible cost of relinquishing his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or preserve
his Fifth Amendment privilege at the cost of relinquishing his
Fourth Amendment right.258 Ruling the conflict unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court declared, “we find it intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another.”259
Based on the Simmons principle, the conflicts between the
Gideon and Duncan rights and defendants’ other constitutional
rights are similarly intolerable and unconstitutional. As seen in
253. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977).
254. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (noting “an
undeniable tension” between the defendant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights). For discussion of Simmons’ significance, see Westen, supra note 49, at
741–44.
255. See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 392–93 (referring to the “proof of standing
necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim”).
256. The Court explained as follows:
[H]is testimony [admitting ownership of the seized item] is to be
regarded as an integral part of his Fourth Amendment exclusion claim.
Under the rule laid down by the courts below, he could give that
[incriminating] testimony only by assuming the risk that the testimony
would later be admitted against him at trial [to prove his guilt].
See id. at 391.
257. See id. at 393 (“[A] defendant who wishes to establish standing must do
so at the risk that the words which he utters may later be used to incriminate
him.”).
258. See id. at 394 (“[The defendant] was obliged either to give up what he
believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal
effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”).
259. Id.
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Part III, Gideon and Duncan coerce defendants to relinquish
eight260 and ten261 constitutional rights, respectively, in order to
exercise their Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and
jury trial. Just as the Simmons defendant faced a situation where
exercise of his Fourth Amendment right risked relinquishing his
Fifth Amendment right, so also the defendants in the examples in
Part III faced situations where exercise of various constitutional
rights risked relinquishing Sixth Amendment rights to appointed
counsel and jury trial. Just as the Simmons defendant faced the
dilemma of being forced to choose between Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights, so also the Part III defendants faced the
dilemma of being forced to choose between various constitutional
rights and the Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and
jury trial. Just as the Simmons defendant risked relinquishing his
Fifth Amendment right in order to meet the eligibility
requirements for enjoying his Fourth Amendment right, so also the
Part III defendants had to relinquish various constitutional rights
to satisfy the eligibility requirements for enjoying their Sixth
Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial.262 Just as
Simmons ruled it unconstitutional and “intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another,”263 so also the Part II defendants surrendering
constitutional rights in order to enjoy the rights to appointed
counsel and jury trial is intolerable and unconstitutional.
While courts and commentators often cite the Simmons
principle as dispositively establishing a constitutional
violation264—many consider it the “ne plus ultra of effective
argumentation”265—the principle is not uniformly followed.266
Noting the unpredictability of the Court’s analysis, Peter Westen
260. See supra Part III.A–H.
261. See supra Part III.A–J.
262. See supra Part III.
263. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
264. See Westen, supra note 49, at 744 n.14 (“Courts and commentators alike
invoke Simmons as a per se rule that prohibits the state from requiring
defendants to choose between any two constitutional entitlements.”).
265. Id. at 744.
266. See id. at 743 (“The subsequent success of the Simmons argument has
been mixed.”)
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explained that “[w]hen the Court is unwilling to allow one
constitutional right to be conditioned on the surrender of another,
it invokes Simmons for the proposition that such choices are
‘constitutionally impermissible.’”267 But “[w]hen the Court is
willing to allow [that], it dismisses Simmons with the observation
that the ‘legal system is replete with situations requiring the
making of difficult [choices].’”268
The leading alternative approach to Simmons is Crampton v.
Ohio.269 The Crampton defendant wished to exercise both his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination as to the issue of guilt
and his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to be heard as
to the issue of punishment.270 But under Ohio’s single-trial
procedure, exercising the right to be heard as to punishment
forfeited his right to remain silent as to guilt; and, exercising his
right to remain silent as to guilt forfeited his right to be heard as
to punishment.271 The defendant argued that the state’s
non-bifurcated procedure for determining both guilt and
imposition of the death penalty violated Simmons by forcing him
to choose between his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.272
Disagreeing that such a coerced choice is necessarily
unconstitutional as under the per se approach of Simmons, the
Court formulated the test as “whether compelling the election
[between constitutional rights] impairs to an appreciable extent
any of the policies behind the rights involved.”273 Applying that
standard, the Court found that if the defendant opted to exercise
his due process right to be heard on punishment (thereby forfeiting
the right to remain silent as to guilt), the policies of the Fifth
Amendment were impaired no more than analogous, clearly
constitutional practices such as requiring a defendant who has
chosen to testify to submit to cross-examination.274 If the defendant
267. Id. (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807–08 (1977);
United States v. Anderson, 567 F.2d 839, 840–41 (8th Cir. 1977)).
268. Id. (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971)).
269. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
270. Id. at 210–11.
271. Id. at 211.
272. Id. at 210–11.
273. Id. at 213.
274. See id. at 215–16 (providing analogous situations, such as submitting to
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instead opted to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent (thereby forfeiting the right to be heard on punishment), the
Court ruled that due process is unimpaired by the defendant
lacking an “opportunity . . . to speak to the jury free from any
adverse consequences on the issue of guilt.”275 Concluding that the
policies of neither right were impaired, regardless of what the
defendant chose, the Court held the conflict constitutional.276
Even under the more stringent Crampton approach, the
conflicts between the Gideon and Duncan rights and various other
constitutional rights are unconstitutional. As to the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel, the conflicts undermine its
policies or rationales in two ways. First, the right to the assistance
of counsel is “the most fundamental of all rights”277 because it is
“the right that ensures that ‘all other rights of the accused are
protected.’”278 The conflicts undermine that rationale by coercing
indigents to forego other rights. Rather than protecting, Gideon
undermines the other rights by coercing their surrender. Second,
the right to appointed counsel is designed to allow indigents to
“stand[] equal before the law” with non-indigents.279 But the
conflicts, by coercing relinquishment of rights of indigents that
non-indigents with private counsel fully retain, only serve to make
indigents even less equal before the law. Rather than allowing
indigents to stand equal, the conflicts cause them to stand even
further behind. The conflicts also undermine the policy and
cross-examination when deciding to testify, standing on a motion for acquittal
versus putting on a defense, and the conflict of the “notice-of-alibi” rule).
275. Id. at 220.
276. See id. at 217, 220 (rejecting the petitioner’s argument regardless of
which choice the petitioner made).
277. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 93, at 32; accord David A. Sklansky,
Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV.
1229, 1279 (2002) (“No criminal procedure right, perhaps, is more fundamental
than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”).
278. Natapoff, supra note 17, at 1051 (quoting Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,
84 (1988)); accord Sklansky, supra note 283, at 1279–80 (“A criminal defendant
needs a lawyer . . . to ensure that all of the defendant’s other rights are
honored . . . . The less criminal defense [counsel] we have, the less enforcement
we have of constitutional criminal procedure.”).
279. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (noting that not
every defendant can be equal if the “poor man charged with crime has to face his
accusers without a lawyer to assist him”).
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rationale of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial by coercing
defendants to forego those other rights to which a jury trial,
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice,”280 is meant to
“complement.”281 The very “structure and style of the criminal
process—the supporting framework and the subsidiary
procedures—are of the sort that naturally complement jury trial,
and have developed in connection with and in reliance upon jury
trial.”282 Coercing defendants to choose between rights that are
designed to complement each other crosses the Crampton
threshold by “impair[ing] . . . the policies behind the rights
involved.”283 As a result, even under Crampton’s stricter approach,
the conflicts are persuasively unconstitutional.
Despite Crampton, the Simmons principle remains vital.284
While “Crampton is sometimes taken as a repudiation of
Simmons,” that view is a “mistake.”285 The Court arguably
overruled Crampton and “continues to adhere to Simmons without
reference to its intervening decision in Crampton.”286 Furthermore,
the “Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Simmons”287 and
“maintained its adherence to this concept.”288 Some “[l]ater cases
have distinguished Simmons on factual or other grounds without
dispelling its notion that a criminal defendant must not be forced
to surrender one constitutional right in order to exercise
another.”289 While the Court has not yet extended Simmons beyond
280. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
281. See id. at 149 n.14 (discussing how the criminal process and its
procedures rely upon the jury trial).
282. Id.
283. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
284. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 217, at 207 (“[T]he Supreme
Court . . . certainly has never expressly rejected its application. The federal
government has . . . conceded the doctrine’s applicability . . . and some circuit
courts have expressly applied the doctrine.”).
285. Westen, supra note 49, at 743 n.10.
286. Id.
287. United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 89 (1980)), aff’d, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir.
2006).
288. Wilson, supra note 217, at 203.
289. Miller v. Smith, 99 F.3d 120, 127 n.9 (4th Cir. 1996), vacated on other
grounds, 115 F.3d 1136 (4th Cir. 1996). For examples of cases distinguishing, but
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conflicts involving the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, it also has
not foreclosed that possibility.290
Realizing that Sixth Amendment and other rights are “no less
important” than Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights,291 state and
federal courts have broadly applied Simmons. Relying on the
Simmons principle, state courts have found unconstitutional
conflicts between the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and to
testify in one’s own defense,292 the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel and the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination,293 as well as between the latter and the
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.294 Concluding that
“[t]he reasoning in Simmons is compelling”295 and “controlling”
beyond its facts,296 federal circuit courts have “followed”297 and

not rejecting, Simmons because the defendant did not have two constitutional
rights in conflict, see United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243 (1974)
(recognizing no conflict between Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel because
defendant lied as to indigency and thus lacked the latter right); Stuard v. Stewart,
401 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Simmons is not violated when a defendant
is forced to choose between a statutory right and a constitutional right.”).
290. See State v. Samuels, 965 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“The
United States Supreme Court has not extended this same protection to the Sixth
Amendment, but neither have they precluded that possibility.”).
291. See United States v. Branker, 418 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1969) (“The
constitutional rights to counsel and to equal protection . . . are no less important
[than Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights].”); Samuels, 965 S.W.2d at 920 (“The
Sixth Amendment . . . is no less important than the Fourth . . . and the Fifth
Amendment . . . .”); accord Kahan, 415 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The
principle of Simmons and Jackson is applicable, if reason is to prevail . . . [to] the
Sixth Amendment.”).
292. See State v. Colson, 650 S.E.2d 656, 659 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“Forcing
defendant to choose between testifying or relinquishing his right to be
represented by counsel constitutes constitutional error.”).
293. See Samuels, 965 S.W.2d at 919 (“Extending Fifth Amendment
protection to Samuels’ statements made to secure his Sixth Amendment rights
[to effective assistance of counsel] is consistent with Simmons.”).
294. See People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Cal. 1975) (“[T]he choice
forced upon [probationer] at his revocation hearing was unnecessarily
inconsistent with constitutional values.”).
295. United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 333 (3d Cir. 1977).
296. United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1979).
297. United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996).
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“extended” Simmons298 in holding a wide variety of conflicts
unconstitutional. The Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits ruled conflicts between the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel unconstitutional.299 The Third, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits found conflicts between the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy and the Fifth
Amendment
privilege
against
self-incrimination
unconstitutional.300 Addressing a conflict between the latter right
and the Sixth Amendment right to testify, the First Circuit
determined it would be unconstitutional as violating Simmons.301
The Second Circuit ruled conflicts between the Sixth Amendment
right to retain counsel of choice and the Fourteenth Amendment
rights to both due process and equal protection unconstitutional.302
The Third Circuit determined a conflict between the Due Process
Clause right to testify and the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel was unconstitutional.303 The Fifth Circuit
298. United States v. Anderson, 567 F.2d 839, 841 n.4 (8th Cir. 1977); see also
State v. Samuels, 965 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that
forcing Anderson to choose between the Sixth and Fifth Amendment rights is not
permissible).
299. See Hardwell, 80 F.3d at 1483–84 (“Several circuits have followed the
reasoning of Simmons and held that a defendant is entitled to some sort of
protection against the use of financial disclosures made to establish eligibility for
appointed counsel.” (citing decisions from the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits)); Anderson, 567 F.2d at 840–41 (“[F]orc[ing] Anderson to choose between
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination . . . is constitutionally impermissible.”).
300. See United States v. Bounos, 693 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir. 1982)
(“[D]efendants would not be waiving their Fifth Amendment rights if they
confessed guilt for the purpose of making out their double jeopardy claim.” (citing
decisions from the Third and Fifth Circuits)).
301. See United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating
that the defendant would not waive his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at
trial if he testified at the preliminary hearing).
302. See Fullan v. Comm’r of Corr., 891 F.2d 1007, 10011–12 (2d Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he state . . . has no right to require that defendant choose between foregoing
retained counsel and foregoing [indigents’ due process and equal protection rights
to a free transcript necessary for] an appeal.”).
303. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir.
1977) (“[B]eing forced to choose between his right to testify and his right to
counsel . . . was an impermissible infringement upon [each].”).
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affirmed the Simmons principle in conflicts between various rights
under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination304
as well as between that right and the Due Process Clause right not
to be tried if incompetent.305 And finally, the Ninth Circuit
declared as unconstitutional a conflict between the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.306
Whether analyzed under Simmons or Crampton, the Gideon
and Duncan-based conflicts are likely unconstitutional. Under
Simmons’ per se approach, simply that there are conflicts between
non-logically converse constitutional rights dispositively
establishes their unconstitutionality.307 Under Crampton’s policy
impairment standard,308 by undermining the protecting and
complementing of other rights rationale of appointed counsel and
jury trial, the conflicts are persuasively unconstitutional.
C. Equal Protection and Due Process
The third and fourth independent bases for the
unconstitutionality of the conflicts, applying to all eight Gideon
and all ten Scott-based conflicts, are the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.309 Due process may be
304. See United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1972)
(noting that barring defendant’s testimony, supporting a motion to suppress a
coerced confession, from being used to establish his guilt at trial safeguarded
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights “in light of Simmons”).
305. See Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1388 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979)
(citing Simmons and noting that defendant’s testimony at arraignment in support
of his incompetency claim would be inadmissible at trial to establish guilt).
306. See Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 723 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
forcing the defendant to “the painful choice of . . . asserting his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim” but risking self-incrimination or “retaining the
privilege but giving up his ineffective assistance claim . . . would violate the spirit,
and perhaps the letter, of Simmons”).
307. See supra notes 251–259 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 269–276 and accompanying text.
309. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (finding that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, formally applicable only to
the States, applies to the federal government as well through the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
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contrasted with equal protection: “‘Due process’ emphasizes
fairness between the State and the individual . . . regardless of
how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. ‘Equal
protection,’ on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in the
treatment by the State between classes of individuals whose
situations are arguably indistinguishable.”310 The Supreme Court
has offered various, somewhat vague standards for due process:
“what is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,”311
“principle[s] so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental,”312 and what is “fundamental to
the protection of life and liberty.”313 Essentially, it requires
“fundamental fairness”;314 the “denial of fundamental fairness”
violates due process.315 In contrast, equal protection violations are
largely a function of the level of review or scrutiny employed.316
Under rational review, a classification is presumptively
constitutional unless the State fails to demonstrate a mere rational
basis for it.317 Under strict or heightened scrutiny, the
classification is presumptively unconstitutional unless the State
demonstrates a “compelling” reason.318 Commentators describe
310. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
311. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
312. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992).
313. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
314. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
315. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
316. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV.
747, 755–56 (2011) (“Heightened scrutiny generally results in the invalidation of
state action. In contrast, rational basis review generally results in the validation
of state action.”).
317. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[E]ven . . . for the
most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the
classification adopted and the object to be attained.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (explaining rational review as assessing
whether the classification “rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state
purpose”); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at
1443 (1st ed. 1978) (noting that rational review is largely “the equivalent of a
strong presumption of constitutionality”).
318. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (stating that any
penalty for exercising a constitutional right is unconstitutional unless “necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest”); accord Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
16 (“[S]trict scrutiny means that the State’s system is not entitled to the usual
presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry
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strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, fatal in fact”319 or a “virtual
death-blow.”320 Strict or “searching judicial scrutiny [is] reserved
for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon
constitutionally protected rights.”321 While indigency or poverty is
generally not a suspect class,322 Gideon and Scott’s impingement
on indigents’ constitutional rights would trigger strict scrutiny.323
In applying the constitutional rights branch of strict scrutiny, the
Court explained, “any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that [constitutional] right, unless shown to be necessary
to
promote
a
compelling
governmental
interest,
is
unconstitutional.”324 Gideon and Scott’s burdening and deterring
only indigents’ constitutional rights qualifies as a likely violation
of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
and, with strict scrutiny a “virtual death-blow,”325 a very likely
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
While due process and equal protection are conceptually
distinct, courts often intertwine their analysis and find violations

a ‘heavy burden of justification . . . .’” (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
343 (1972))).
319. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
320. TRIBE, supra note 317, § 16-30, at 1089.
321. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40; accord Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (explaining that
unless a law burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class, the Court
will review it under rational basis).
322. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) (“[T]his Court has never
held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis.”). But see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 61 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(including indigency as among “other classifications that, at least in some
settings, are also ‘suspect’”).
323. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[Griffin
and its progeny] concerned fundamental interests subject to heightened
scrutiny.”).
324. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. Note that this test is somewhat similar to the
Jackson principle: “[Q]uite apart from the Equal Protection clause, a state law
that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the
Constitution is, of course, presumptively invalid, whether or not the law’s purpose
or effect is to create any classifications.” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 61 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
325. TRIBE, supra note 317, § 16-30.
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resting on both grounds.326 As Griffin v. Illinois,327 the “seminal
ruling on the state’s general obligation to provide ‘equal justice’ in
the criminal justice process,”328 declared, both “due process and
equal protection call for procedures in criminal trials which allow
no invidious discriminations . . . . Both . . . emphasize the central
aim
of
our
entire
judicial
system—all
[defendants] . . . must . . . ‘stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.’”329
Griffin held that burdening indigents’ right to appeal by not
furnishing free trial transcripts violated equal protection and due
process.330 The Court reasoned, “[t]here can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate
appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy
transcripts.”331 In Roberts v. LaVallee,332 the Court extended the
Griffin right to preliminary hearing transcripts.333 The Court
explained, “Our decisions for more than a decade now have made
clear that differences in access to the instruments needed to
vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial situation of
the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution.”334 Relying on
Griffin and Roberts, in 2004 the Ninth Circuit extended the Griffin
right by recognizing an equal protection violation in the State’s
failure to provide a complete transcript of all prior proceedings to

326. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (explaining that
Griffin and its progeny “reflect ‘both equal protection and due process concerns’”
(quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996))); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.
660, 665 (1983) (“Due process and equal protection principles converge in the
Court’s analysis in these cases.”).
327. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
328. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 590.
329. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (quoting Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
330. See id. at 19–20 (“Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to
affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none.”).
331. Id. at 19.
332. 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
333. See id. at 42–43 (“[T]he New York statute . . . as applied to deny a free
transcript to an indigent, could not meet the test of our prior decisions.”).
334. Id. at 42.
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an indigent.335 Similarly, when indigents must relinquish ten
constitutional rights in order to ensure enjoyment of the right to
appointed counsel, but non-indigents retaining counsel need not
relinquish any, indigents are not receiving equal justice.
The Court’s application of the Griffin analysis to appointed
counsel for indigents on appeal, however, is mixed. Relying on
Griffin, Douglas v. California336 held that denying indigent felons
appointed counsel on their first appeal as of right violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.337 Such denial is “‘a discrimination at
least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin.’”338 By denying
indigents appointed counsel on appeal when non-indigents retain
private counsel, the Court “think[s] an unconstitutional line has
been drawn between rich and poor.”339 That the indigent, lacking
counsel, “has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich
man has a meaningful appeal” is unconstitutional.340 Ross v.
Moffitt,341 however, declined to extend the Douglas right to
subsequent, discretionary appeals.342 The Court declared that
equal protection and due process requires the State not to
“duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained [by a
non-indigent] . . . but only to assure the indigent defendant an
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly.”343 That is, while
Griffin and Douglas demand equal justice and opportunity for
indigents, Ross only requires adequate opportunity.

335. See Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d 1041, 1046–51 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We
conclude that the Court’s cases clearly establish that an indigent defendant must
be provided with a transcript of prior proceedings . . . .”).
336. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
337. See id. at 357–58 (“There is lacking that equality demanded by the
Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the
benefit of counsel . . . while the indigent . . . is forced to shift for himself.”).
338. Id. at 355 (quoting People v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1072, 1076 (Cal. 1960)
(Traynor, J., concurring)).
339. Id. at 357.
340. Id. at 358.
341. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
342. See id. at 609–12 (“[W]e do not believe that the Equal Protection
Clause . . . requires North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent
defendants seeking to take discretionary appeals.”).
343. Id.
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Even under standards similar to Ross’ narrower approach,
courts have found numerous equal protection and due process
violations concerning indigent criminal defendants. Citing Ross,
the Court in Bounds v. Smith344 ruled that the State must provide
indigent prisoners with “law libraries or other forms of legal
assistance . . . to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity
to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights
to the courts.”345 Relying on the Court’s admonition in Britt v.
North Carolina346 that equal protection requires the State to
provide indigents “with the basic tools of an adequate defense,”347
the Court in Ake v. Oklahoma348 determined that due process
requires a state to provide an indigent capital offender with the
expert assistance of a psychiatrist for his insanity defense.349 The
Court reasoned that an indigent “must have a fair opportunity to
present his defense . . . [and] that justice cannot be equal where,
simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in
which his liberty is at stake.”350 Indigents must have “[m]eaningful
access to justice . . . and access to the raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense.”351 The Court found that the
State’s interest in avoiding the financial burden of supplying
expert assistance to indigents was “not substantial, in light of the
compelling interest of both the State and the individual [indigent]
in accurate dispositions.”352 Under both due process and equal
protection, most courts addressing the extension of Ake have
concluded353 that the Ake right extends to noncapital offenders,
344. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
345. Id. at 825.
346. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
347. Id. at 227.
348. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
349. See id. at 83 (holding that the State must assure access to a psychiatrist
if the defendant demonstrates that his sanity will be a “significant factor at trial”).
350. Id. at 76.
351. Id. at 77.
352. Id. at 79.
353. See Huske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) (noting that
“most courts” addressing the issue “have held that the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses require the appointment of non-psychiatric experts to assist
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defenses other than insanity, and non-psychiatric experts
including “toxicologists, pathologists, fingerprint experts,
hypnotists, DNA analysts, serologists, ballistics experts,
handwriting examiners, blood spatter specialists, forensic dentists
for bite-mark comparisons, psychologists for battered wife
syndrome, as well as other types of experts.”354
Similarly, the rights afforded criminal defendants emanating
from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments (those rights subject to the conflicts in Part III)355 are
necessary to provide, under Ross’ standard, an “adequate
opportunity to present his claims fairly.”356 No less than law
libraries, hypnotists, and forensic dentists, an indigent’s
constitutional rights are part of Britt’s “basic tools of an adequate
defense”357 and Ake’s “raw materials integral to the building of an
effective defense.”358 Coercing the relinquishment of and
burdening such constitutional rights denies the indigent, in Ake’s
terms, “the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake” and denies indigents
“[m]eaningful access to justice.”359 If newly minted constitutional
rights (such as expert assistance from hypnotists and forsensic
dentists) are recognized by being necessary for, in Ake’s terms,
“meaningful participation,” “meaningful access to justice,” and
among the requisite tools of an adequate defense,360 then a fortiori
so also are the long-standing constitutional rights expressly
guaranteed by or emanating from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

indigent defendants”); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to
Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305,
1369 (2004) (“Most courts assume that Ake applies to noncapital cases.”); cf.
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Inequality to Reframe Indigent Defense
Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1226 (2013) (noting courts’ extension of Ake’s
rationale to other types of expert and non-expert assistance to indigents).
354. Giannelli, supra note 353, at 1367–68; accord LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
48, at 605 (discussing other types of experts to which Ake has been extended).
355. See supra Part III.
356. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
357. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
358. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
359. Id. at 76–77.
360. Id.
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and Fourteenth Amendments (discussed in Part III).361 For
example, the Fourth Circuit found that the long-established,
explicitly guaranteed Sixth Amendment right to “the assistance of
an attorney is one of the ‘raw materials integral to the building of
an effective defense.’”362 Similarly, Gideon and Scott’s coerced
relinquishment and penalization of indigents’ constitutional rights
constitute a denial of or impingement on Britt’s “basic tools of an
adequate defense”363 and Ake’s “meaningful access to justice.”364
Furthermore, the State’s financial interest in not supplying
appointed counsel to all indigent criminal defendants365 is,
applying Ake’s balancing, “not substantial, in light of the
compelling interest of both the State and the individual [indigent]
in accurate dispositions.”366 Therefore, Gideon and Scott’s coerced
relinquishment and penalization of indigents’ constitutional rights
violate equal protection and due process.
The case most on point—perhaps the only decision addressing
whether unconstitutionally conflicting constitutional rights
afflicting only indigents independently violates equal protection or
due process—is the Fourth Circuit’s Miller v. Smith.367 The state
court denied the indigent, represented by a private attorney pro
bono, his Griffin right to a free transcript under a state rule
limiting the right to indigents represented by state public

361. See supra Part III.
362. Miller v. Smith (Miller I), 99 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ake,
470 U.S. at 77), vacated on other grounds, 115 F.3d 1136 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
For other examples, see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 404 (1985) (describing the
State’s denial of a transcript in Griffin as “violating equal protection principles
because it distinguished between poor and rich with respect to such a vital right”
(emphasis added)); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967) (holding that
indigents’ court-appointed counsel must advocate their clients’ interests as
zealously as retained counsel to “assure penniless defendants the same
rights . . . as are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but who
are able to afford the retention of private counsel” (emphasis added)).
363. Britt, 404 U.S. at 227.
364. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
365. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
366. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
367. See Miller I, 99 F.3d 120, 126–27 (4th Cir. 1996) (addressing whether an
indigent should be afforded the same right to a free transcript if he obtained his
own attorney).
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defenders.368 On appeal, the defendant argued that the state rule
unconstitutionally created a “Hobson’s choice”: either obtain his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice only by foregoing his
Griffin right to a free transcript or obtain his Griffin right only by
foregoing his right to counsel of choice and accepting
representation from a state public defender.369 Citing Simmons
that such Hobson’s choices are “intolerable,”370 the Fourth Circuit
declared that “[f]orcing an indigent to choose between two rights
guaranteed by the Constitution results in the denial of one right or
the other. Imposition of that dilemma upon [the defendant] thus
affronts our notions of basic fairness.”371 Applying strict scrutiny
and determining the state lacked a compelling reason, the court
additionally ruled that the unconstitutional dilemma violated
“equal protection principles.”372 The court explained that the
indigent was “forced to choose between his constitutional rights in
a way that a wealthier defendant is not. That outcome cannot be
judged consistent with the guarantee of meaningful access to
justice.”373 While vacated on other grounds,374 nonetheless a total
of four Fourth Circuit judges agreed (and only one disagreed) that
unconstitutionally conflicting constitutional rights afflicting only
indigents does violate equal protection or due process.375 Similarly,
368. See id. at 122–23 (discussing Miller’s refusal to obtain a public defender,
and his subsequent inability to obtain a transcript for appeal).
369. See id. at 127 (“Although he had an attorney at no cost to the State,
Miller was told he must give up that attorney in order to receive a free
transcript.”).
370. Id. (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)).
371. Id. at 128.
372. See id. at 128–30 (“It violates equal protection principles because it
distinguishe[s] between poor and rich with respect to such a vital right.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
373. Id. at 130.
374. See Miller v. Smith (Miller II), 115 F.3d 1136, 1139 (4th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (affirming the District Court). The en banc panel avoided the issue by
strangely ruling that because indigents lack the right to counsel of choice among
state public defenders, the defendant also lacked the right to counsel of choice
despite having retained private pro bono counsel. Id. at 1143–44.
375. The four judges agreeing consisted of the two judges who were in the
majority of the original panel, see Miller I, 99 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir. 1996), as
well as two different dissenting judges in the en banc decision. See Miller II, 115
F.3d at 1144 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The one judge disagreeing was the
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the Gideon and Scott-based conflicts force only indigents, but not
non-indigents retaining counsel, to choose between constitutional
rights.376 Such a denial of “[m]eaningful access to justice”377 for
indigents violates equal protection and due process.
D. Objections
This section anticipates and addresses five possible objections.
First, Scott, not Gideon, causes the conflicts involving the right to
appointed counsel.378 Second, the conflicts are constitutional as
inevitable and unavoidable consequences of any defendant’s
litigation strategy.379 Third, the conflicts occur because defendants
lack eligibility for constitutional rights rather than being forced to
relinquish them.380 Fourth, the conflicts only arise because
defendants receive appointed counsel and jury trial despite being
constitutionally ineligible for them.381 Fifth, no rational defendant
would forego the chance at obtaining a dismissal of a more serious
charge.382 None of these objections, however, is persuasive.
1. Scott, Not Gideon, Causes the Conflicts
With respect only to the Gideon-based conflicts, one might
object that the unconstitutional conflicts stem from Scott (and not
Gideon). Furthermore, as to the Scott-based conflicts, with Scott
not qualifying as a full constitutional right but only a conditional
one (conditioned on the indigent receiving imprisonment),383 the
claimed conflicts are either false conflicts or constitutional.

dissenter in the original panel. Miller I, 99 F.3d at 130 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
376. See supra Part III.
377. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
378. See infra Part IV.D.1.
379. See infra Part IV.D.2.
380. See infra Part IV.D.3.
381. See infra Part IV.D.4.
382. See infra Part IV.D.5.
383. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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The objection fails for three reasons. First, eight of the ten
conflicts depict scenarios of the Gideon right conflicting with other
constitutional rights. In those scenarios, the only right to
appointed counsel the indigent has is under Gideon;384 the indigent
simply has no Scott right to appointed counsel. That those same
conflicts, in alternative scenarios, also arise under Scott, does not
make Scott the cause of the conflicts in the scenarios exclusively
involving Gideon.
Second, to see the irrelevance of Scott to those eight
Gideon-based conflicts in another way, suppose Scott is overturned
and there is simply and absolutely no constitutional right to
appointed counsel for misdemeanors. Nothing in the analysis of
the Gideon-based conflicts would change as a result. The conflicts
would still arise and be unconstitutional under the same bases. It
is still the Gideon right that burdens, penalizes, chills, deters, and
coerces relinquishment of other constitutional rights.385 It is still
the Gideon right that results in inequities between indigents and
non-indigents that violate equal protection and due process.386
Third, that Scott only supplies a conditional constitutional
right precludes only the second basis of unconstitutionality—one
constitutional right coercing the relinquishment of another.387 But
the Article makes no claim that this basis of unconstitutionality—
the Simmons principle—applies to Scott-based conflicts.388 The
other three bases do not require a constitutional right to be the
cause of the burdening, penalizing, chilling, or deterring of
constitutional rights or the inequities affecting only indigents that
violate due process and equal protection.389 For example, in Griffin
v. California, what unconstitutionally burdened the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment privilege was not another constitutional right
but merely a trial court’s comment to the jury.390 Similarly, in
384. See supra Part III.A–H.
385. See supra Part III.A–H.
386. See supra Part IV.C.
387. See supra Part IV.B.
388. See supra Part IV.B.
389. See supra Part IV.A, C–D.
390. See 380 U.S. 609, 610 (1965) (describing the trial courts comment to the
jury that they might consider the defendant’s failure to deny facts by refusing to
testify as evidence that they may be more probable).
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Douglas v. California, what violated the indigent felon’s due
process and equal protection rights was not another constitutional
right but a state rule denying appointed counsel on an appeal.391
2. Conflicts Constitutional as Consequence of Strategic Choices
One might object that the conflicts stemming from Gideon,
Scott, and Duncan are nothing more than the result of litigation
strategies or tactics. Inevitably, all defendants must make difficult
decisions that accrue some benefits and incur some costs. For
example, should a defendant testify in her own defense or remain
silent? Should a defendant choose representation by counsel or
elect to self-represent? These are strategic decisions involving
conflicting constitutional rights that may result in advantaging or
disadvantaging the defendant. Yet these are clearly considered
constitutionally permissible.392 The conflicts caused by Gideon,
Scott, and Duncan, the objection maintains, are no different and
no less constitutional.
True, conflicts between mutually opposed constitutional
rights—as
featured
in
the
objection’s
examples—are
constitutionally acceptable.393 Because of their mutual or logical
opposition they cannot be enjoyed simultaneously; one must
necessarily choose one right or the other. Such rights have an X
and not-X relationship, precluding simultaneous exercise “because
the two activities are logically incompatible.”394 They are “logical
converses” to one another.395 But the conflicts between the rights
to appointed counsel and jury trial, and the ten other
constitutional rights are not such logical converses. The rights to
appointed counsel and jury trial are not merely susceptible to
391. See 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (“In California . . . once the court has
‘gone through’ the record and denied counsel, the indigent has no recourse but to
prosecute his appeal on his own . . . .”).
392. See, e.g., State v. Chappelle, 667 S.E.2d 327, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)
(determining that a choice between “mutually exclusive” rights is constitutional).
393. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing a Simmons violation from situations where
defendant “chose between mutually exclusive constitutional rights”).
394. Westen, supra note 49, at 743 n.7.
395. See id. (discussing rights that by their nature cannot both be given effect
simultaneously).

766

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 703 (2018)

simultaneous enjoyment with other rights, their very rationales
require simultaneous enjoyment with other rights: to protect,
support, and complement other rights.396 In addition, the Gideon
and Scott-based coercive dilemmas cannot be dismissed as an
inevitable aspect of the difficult strategic choices inherent in
criminal prosecutions that any defendant must make because only
indigents face them.397
3. Relinquishing Rights v. Ineligibility for Rights
One might object that in some scenarios of some of the conflicts
the defendants are seeking to satisfy the eligibility requirements
for the rights to appointed counsel and jury trial—sufficiently
serious charged offenses or punishment—by foregoing other
constitutional rights. Because the defendants in those scenarios
have not yet met those eligibility requirements, they do not possess
these rights, and thus these rights cannot unconstitutionally
conflict with other rights.
There are a number of responses to this objection. First, that
conditions or eligibility requirements must be satisfied before a
right may be enjoyed is not unique to the rights to appointed
counsel and jury trial. For example, both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights involved in Simmons had conditions that had
to be satisfied and that did not preclude the Court from finding an
unconstitutional conflict.398 In order to become eligible to assert his
Fourth Amendment right that the seizure was unreasonable, the
Simmons defendant had to satisfy a standing requirement and

396. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
397. See supra Part III.
398. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment requires proof that the person asserting the right is the one
whose protection was infringed). Though Simmons only discussed conditions for
the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination has conditions that must be satisfied in order for the right to
be enjoyed. See, e.g., United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 626 n.5 (2d Cir.
1990) (“It is true that the fifth amendment privilege is not ‘self-executing.’”);
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 482 (noting that witnesses generally “bear the
obligation . . . to assert the [Fifth Amendment] on their own initiative”).
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establish that the seized property was his.399 And to do so, the
defendant would have to self-incriminate.400 Despite conditions to
be satisfied or eligibility requirements for both rights, the Court
ruled that the defendant was coerced to relinquish his Fifth
Amendment right in order to exercise his Fourth Amendment
right; and, in order to exercise his Fifth Amendment right, he
would be coerced into relinquishing his Fourth Amendment
right.401 In ruling the conflict unconstitutional, that there were
conditions or eligibility requirements was irrelevant.402 What was
unconstitutional according to the Court was placing the defendant
in a coercive dilemma in which he had to choose between
constitutional rights.403 And this dilemma arises and the
defendant’s choice occurs prior to satisfying the conditions or
eligibility requirements for each right. It was only after the
Simmons defendant made his dilemmatic choice to assert his
Fourth Amendment claim, and waive his Fifth Amendment right,
that the defendant satisfied the conditions (the standing
requirements) for the Fourth Amendment claim.404 As a result,
under the Simmons principle, there can be an unconstitutional
conflict between constitutional rights even when, at least in a
technical sense, the defendant has not satisfied all of the
conditions for enjoying the rights. Arguably, the eligibility
requirements for appointed counsel and jury trial—sufficiently
serious charged offenses or punishment—are similarly irrelevant.
399. See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 390–91 (“At one time a defendant who wished
to assert a Fourth Amendment objection was required to show that he was the
owner or possessor of the seized property.”).
400. See id. at 393 (discussing how the testimony of the defendant to establish
Fourth Amendment standing would then be self-incriminating if used against
him at trial).
401. See id. at 394 (“We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in
support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his
testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of
guilt.”).
402. See id. (ruling that the conflict was unconstitutional in spite of the
eligibility requirement).
403. See id. (“[W]e find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have
to be surrendered in order to assert another.”).
404. See id. at 393 (showing that the ability to use the testimony against the
defendant at trial only occurs if the testimony occurs).
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Just as the Simmons defendant had to satisfy an eligibility
requirement for the Fourth Amendment by foregoing the Fifth
Amendment, the defendants in some scenarios in Part III had to
satisfy eligibility requirements for the rights to appointed counsel
and jury trial by foregoing other constitutional rights.405 Second,
even if the objection is correct, it only pertains to one of the four
bases for constitutionality. Only the second basis—the Simmons
principle—requires two constitutional rights to be in conflict; the
other three only require the presence of one constitutional right.406
Third, only four of the conflicts include scenarios of defendants
trying to attain (rather than maintain) rights to appointed counsel
and jury trial.407 Furthermore, three of these four conflicts arise in
alternative procedural contexts where the defendants are seeking
to maintain existing appointed counsel and jury trial.408 As a
result, the objection only challenges one of the conflicts.409 The
most successful the objection can be is to eliminate one of the four
bases for unconstitutionality of only one of the conflicts. Because
the objection does not establish that any of the conflicts are
constitutional, the objection fails.
4. Defendants Receiving Appointed Counsel and Jury Trial
Despite Constitutional Ineligibility
One might object that in some scenarios of some of the conflicts
defendants receive appointed counsel and jury trial despite not
being constitutionally entitled to them. As a result, the claimed
conflicts are not actual conflicts between constitutional rights held
by the particular defendant and only arise by luck. As a result, the
conflicts are constitutional.
The objection is inapplicable to seven of the ten conflicts.410 In
those seven, either no scenario involves a defendant receiving
constitutionally unentitled appointed counsel and jury trial or
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

See supra Part III.
See supra notes 387–391 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B, D–E, H.
See supra Part III.D–E, H.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.A–B, D–H.
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there are alternative scenarios of the same conflict where the
defendant does not receive constitutionally unentitled appointed
counsel and jury trial.411 Only three of the ten conflicts arise solely
in contexts where defendants receive constitutionally unentitled
appointed counsel and/or jury trial on at least one of their
charges.412 As to those three, the objection is only possibly
applicable to one of the four bases for unconstitutionality: only the
Simmons principle—coercing the relinquishment of one
constitutional right in order to exercise another—requires that the
defendant have a constitutional right to appointed counsel or jury
trial.413 Neither that which burdens, penalizes, chills, or deters a
constitutional right nor that which produces inequities in
constitutional rights violating equal protection and due process
need be a constitutional right itself.414 By only being applicable to
one of the four bases for unconstitutionality of only three of the ten
conflicts, the objection fails to establish that any of the ten conflicts
are constitutional.
5. Conflicts Caused by Irrational Defendants
One might object that no rational defendant would forego
constitutional rights and a possible dismissal of a more serious
charge in order to exercise other rights and maximize the chance
for an acquittal on all charges. Conflicts based on a defendant
acting so irrationally are implausible and thus the resulting
unconstitutional conflicts fail to raise a serious concern.
The objection fails for four reasons. First, the seeming
irrationality of defendants fails to make the conflicts implausible.
As discussed above, defendants often make seemingly unwise or
irrational choices; their lack of wisdom or rationality does not
prevent conflicting rights from being held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.415 Second, also discussed above, defendants faced
411. See supra Part III.A–B, D–H.
412. See supra Part III.C, I–J.
413. See supra Part IV.B. For discussion of whether the objection is applicable
at all, see supra Part IV.D.3.
414. See supra notes 387–391 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 132–139 and accompanying text.

770

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 703 (2018)

with multiple charges might well have numerous rational reasons,
specific to their situation, for choosing to forego exercising a
constitutional right and a chance at obtaining the dismissal of a
more serious charge.416 Third, empirical evidence of prosecutorial
charging decisions supports the rationality of defendants foregoing
constitutional rights. Prosecutors sometimes forego filing more
serious charges to preclude defendants’ eligibility for appointed
counsel and jury trial,417 thereby minimizing the chances of an
acquittal.418 That is, prosecutors sometimes engage in strategic
undercharging because less is more: a lesser charge of a
misdemeanor may entail a more likely conviction.419 Similarly,
defendants may rationally forego the chance to dismiss a felony
count because more is less: a more serious felony charge may entail
a less likely conviction. Because of the enhanced procedural
safeguards and lower probability of conviction for felony charges,
“the defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor may be left at
a greater disadvantage than if he had been charged with a
felony.”420 Fourth, there are two notable contexts in which
defendants assuming the risk of facing greater jeopardy in order to
maximize their chance at a complete acquittal is quite
commonplace. Under the “All-or-Nothing Doctrine,”421 defendants
416. See supra text preceding and following note 131.
417. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 192 n.51 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (noting “that the ‘huge proportion’ of criminal charges for which jury
trial has not been available in America is increased by the judicious action of
weary prosecutors” (quoting ERNST W. PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW 87–88 (1953))).
418. See Crane, supra note 88, at 811–18 (explaining that because prosecutors
are “conviction maximizers,” they engage in “strategic undercharging” to deny
defendants the procedural advantages, such as jury trial and able counsel, that
attach to more serious charges so as to increase the likelihood of conviction); see
also Issa Kohler-Huasmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66
STAN. L. REV. 611, 659 n.133, 662 n.142 (2014) (characterizing charge reductions
“to ensure a bench trial” as “standard practice” among New York City
prosecutors).
419. See Crane, supra note 88, at 795–96 (“In some cases, the likelihood of
conviction is also increased by filing a misdemeanor . . . .”).
420. Id. at 781.
421. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, The All-or-Nothing Doctrine in
Criminal Cases: Independent Trial Strategy or Gamesmanship Gone Awry? 26
AM. J. CRIM. L. 257, 258 (1999) (explaining the doctrine as “a strategy that permits
parties in a criminal trial to forego instructions on provable lesser-included
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often decline their right to have the jury instructed on
lesser-included offenses to enhance their likelihood of acquittal.422
Similarly, defendants quite routinely decline plea bargains and
choose to go to trial, thereby facing more serious charges and/or
punishment, to obtain a complete acquittal.423
E. Summary
This Part discussed the four bases for the unconstitutionality
of the conflicts. First, Gideon, Scott, and Duncan burden, penalize,
chill, and deter the exercise of eight or more constitutional
rights.424 Because this principle—the Jackson principle—is widely
ignored in the plea bargaining context, it is understood as
inconsistently followed.425 Outside of the plea bargain context,
however, the Jackson principle remains vital426 and persuasively
establishes the unconstitutionality of the conflicts.427 Second,
Gideon and Duncan coerce defendants to relinquish eight and ten
constitutional rights, respectively, in order to exercise others—the
Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial.428
Under Simmons’ per se approach, the conflicts are clearly
unconstitutional.429 Under Crampton’s policy impairment
offenses, thereby forcing the jury to choose between conviction and acquittal on
the greater charge”).
422. See, e.g., United States v. Bastidas, 658 F. App’x 878, 879 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“A defendant’s failure to request a lesser included offense instruction may be
considered a strategic choice to seek a complete acquittal.”); Moore v. Tennessee,
485 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2016) (“Choosing not to request lesser-included
offense instructions appears to be consistent with an all or nothing defense.”).
423. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as a
Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1914 (1992) (discussing plea bargaining as a
defendant exchanging the risk of a maximum penalty by accepting the risk that
he missed out on a lesser punishment or an acquittal).
424. See supra Part IV.A.
425. See supra notes 232–248 and accompanying text.
426. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, 1010 (noting that the “lower courts
continue to apply the Jackson principle even where the death penalty is
involved”).
427. See supra Part IV.A.
428. See supra Part III.A–J.
429. See supra Part IV.B.
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approach, the conflicts are likely unconstitutional because they
violate the underlying rationales of the Sixth Amendment rights
to appointed counsel and jury trial. Rather than serving to protect,
support, and complement defendants’ other rights, Gideon and
Duncan undermine them by coercing their relinquishment. Third,
Gideon and Scott violate equal protection by causing disparities
between indigents and non-indigents in the enjoyment of eight and
ten constitutional rights, respectively.430 With the nearly fatal
strict scrutiny standard of review applicable because of the
impingement on constitutional rights,431 the conflicts between
Gideon and Scott and the other constitutional rights are very likely
unconstitutional. Fourth, Gideon and Scott violate due process.432
The denial to indigents of comparatively exotic expert assistance—
hypnotists and forensic dentists—has been held to violate due
process because such assistance qualifies as a basic tool and raw
material of an adequate defense and necessary for meaningful
participation in and access to justice.433 A fortiori, coercing
indigents’ relinquishment of long-standing, fundamental
constitutional rights violates due process.
Each of these four bases is independent. That the conflicts may
be deemed constitutional under one basis does not preclude them
from being unconstitutional under another. For example, even if
Gideon, Scott, and Duncan’s burdening, penalizing, chilling, and
deterring of other constitutional rights and Gideon and Duncan’s
coercing relinquishment of some constitutional rights in order to
enjoy others is deemed constitutional, the inequities between
indigents and non-indigents’ enjoyment of their other
constitutional rights caused by Gideon and Scott may violate equal
protection and due process.

430. See supra Part IV.C.
431. See supra notes 321–324 and accompanying text.
432. See supra Part IV.C.
433. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (stating that “meaningful
access to justice” requires an indigent defendant is afforded similar tools to mount
a defense as his non-indigent counterparts).
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V. Resolving the Unconstitutional Conflicts
If Part IV established that the conflicts presented in Part III
are plausibly unconstitutional, what is the remedy? This Part first
considers two existing remedies434 and then proposes two ad hoc
remedies,435 none of which resolves all of the conflicts. It next
presents three remedies resolving all of the conflicts.436 Rejecting
one as implausible and another as irrational, Part V concludes that
the preferable remedy is extending the right to appointed counsel
to all indigents and the right to jury trial to all defendants.
A. Existing, Partial Remedies
Two existing remedies address some of the conflicts. First, as
to only one scenario of the conflict between appointed counsel and
the Fifth Amendment,437 indigents’ self-incriminating statements
made to establish appointed counsel as warranted under Scott
might be inadmissible at trial.438 But this remedy resolves neither
four alternative scenarios of the conflict439 nor the other nine
conflicts.
Second, as to scenarios of seven Duncan-based conflicts
arising because defendants charged with both serious and petty
offenses receive jury trial for both,440 some jurisdictions send the
petty offense to the judge and only the serious offense to the jury.441
While providing a remedy in those jurisdictions, other jurisdictions
provide jury trials for both offenses.442 Furthermore, the remedy is
434. See infra Part V.A.
435. See infra Part V.B.
436. See infra Part V.C.
437. See supra note 179.
438. Cf. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 608 (“The indigency determination
statutes in several states provide that the [financial] information furnished by
the defendant will not be admissible in the subsequent criminal prosecution.”).
439. See supra Part III.E.
440. See supra Part III.A, C–H.
441. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, at 1072 (noting “the practice followed
in some jurisdictions of sending only the nonpetty offense to the jury and leaving
the petty offense charge to be determined by the judge”).
442. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-705(b-1) (2014) (providing that a defendant who
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inapplicable to alternative scenarios of six of those seven
conflicts.443 Consequently, it resolves only one Duncan-based
conflict444 and none of the others.
B. Ad Hoc, Partial Remedies
While lacking a principled basis, two possible ad hoc remedies
avoid some of the conflicts. First, as to scenarios of six Gideon and
Duncan-based conflicts arising because defendants charged with
both felonies and misdemeanors (eligible for neither appointed
counsel nor jury trial) receive jury trial and appointed counsel for
both,445 such defendants could neither be tried jointly on nor
receive appointed counsel for both offenses. The remedy, however,
entails separate trials that are more expensive for the State than
a combined trial. Given that the presumptive reason for limiting
the rights to appointed counsel and jury trial in the first place is
financial cost,446 the remedy is self-defeating. More importantly, it
fails to resolve alternative scenarios and other conflicts featuring
defendants with no felony charge447 or only one charge at a time.448
Furthermore, the ad hoc remedy avoids none of the ten Duncan
and Scott-based conflicts all involving defendants lacking felony
charges.449 By avoiding only one of the eight Gideon and
Duncan-based conflicts,450 the remedy fails.
faces one jury demandable offense may invoke a jury trial for all charged
offenses).
443. See supra Part III.A, D–H.
444. See supra Part III.C.
445. See supra Part III.A, C, E–H.
446. See Christopher, supra note 109, at 1921 and accompanying text (quoting
Justice Powell that “the price of pursuing this easy course could be high indeed
in terms of its adverse impact on the administration of the criminal justice
systems of [fifty s]tates”); Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542–43
(1989) (explaining the state’s interest in a speedy trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (noting that efficient law enforcement outweighs the
defendant’s interest in not being convicted of a petty offense).
447. See supra Part III.B, D–E, H.
448. See supra Part III.A, D–H.
449. See supra Part III.A–J.
450. See supra Part III.A–F.
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Second, once counsel is appointed and jury trial is scheduled
for a particular charge, the defendant cannot lose the appointed
counsel and jury trial for that charge even if otherwise no longer
constitutionally entitled to them. Though remedying some
scenarios of nine of the ten conflicts,451 the remedy entails the
State paying for appointed counsel and jury trials when not
otherwise constitutionally required. Again, given that financial
cost is the rationale for limiting distribution of the rights, the
remedy is self-defeating. More importantly, the remedy fails to
avoid one of the Gideon and Duncan-based conflicts452 and three of
the Scott and Duncan-based conflicts453 where defendants seek to
attain (not maintain existing) appointed counsel or jury trial. (A
remedy barring loss of appointed counsel and jury trial fails to aid
defendants already lacking both.) In addition, the remedy fails to
avoid six conflicts arising because defendants forego constitutional
rights fearing prosecutors’ substitution of charges warranting
appointed counsel and jury trial with charges entitled to neither.454
While completely avoiding three of the conflicts,455 the remedy fails
to avoid seven others.456
Individually, none of the two existing and two proposed ad hoc
remedies is satisfactory. Even the combined effect of implementing
all four resolves completely only three of the conflicts,457 leaving
seven unresolved.458
C. Resolving All Ten Conflicts
There are three remedies that resolve or avoid all ten conflicts.
First, eliminate entirely the Sixth Amendment rights to appointed
counsel and jury trial. Without such rights, defendants would have
no incentive to relinquish existing constitutional rights to secure
non-existent ones. Though successfully resolving all of the
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

See supra Part III.A, C–J.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B, D–E.
See supra Part III.A, D–H.
See supra Part III.C, I–J.
See supra Part III.A–B, D–H.
See supra Part III.C, I–J.
See supra Part III.A–B, D–H.
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conflicts, invalidating a landmark decision as celebrated as Gideon
and a right as fundamental as the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial marks the remedy as surely implausible.
Second, replace Gideon, Scott, and Duncan’s proportional
allocation with a disproportional allocation. That is, rather than
heightened procedural protections, diminished procedural
protections would accompany more severe crimes or punishments.
Indigents charged with misdemeanors would be guaranteed
appointed counsel. Indigents charged with felonies would only
receive appointed counsel if not sentenced with imprisonment.
Defendants charged with petty offenses would have the right to
jury trial, but defendants charged with serious offenses would not.
Such a disproportional allocation avoids all ten conflicts by
aligning with what defendants’ other constitutional rights
facilitate. Both appointed counsel and jury trial eligibility and the
exercise of other constitutional rights would align toward
minimizing inculpatory evidence, maximizing exculpatory
evidence, avoiding more serious charges, and avoiding more severe
punishment. Rather than undermining, defendants’ exercising
their other constitutional rights would aid obtaining appointed
counsel and jury trial. Despite resolving all of the conflicts such a
remedy would be considered as “outrageous . . . a perversion,”459
and irrational.
Third, replace the proportional allocation with a
transsubstantive allocation. That is, extend Gideon to all indigents
and Duncan to all defendants. Making those two rights applicable
regardless of the severity of crime or punishment eliminates any
incentive to forego exercising other constitutional rights to obtain
appointed counsel and jury trial. A transsubstantive allocation
thereby avoids all the conflicts. As the only remedy resolving all
ten conflicts that is plausible and rational, extending the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel to all indigents and the
right to jury trial to all defendants is the preferable resolution.

459.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).
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VI. Conclusion
Allocating constitutional rights of criminal defendants
proportionally—rights attach or strengthen as offense or
punishment severity increases—creates a tension with the general
function of defendants’ other rights that facilitate decreasing
offense or punishment severity. That tension potentially triggers
conflicts between proportionally allocated rights and other
constitutional rights. Defendants face a coercive dilemma in which
exercise of the latter rights risks relinquishing the former rights,
and vice-versa. That this potential for conflict yields actual
conflicts is illustrated by perhaps the two most important and
prominent proportionally allocated rights. The Sixth Amendment
rights to appointed counsel under Gideon and Scott and jury trial
under Duncan conflict, under some circumstances, with ten
constitutional rights emanating from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.460 These conflicts are
unconstitutional under four independent bases.461 First, Gideon,
Scott and Duncan burden, penalize, chill, and deter the exercise of
constitutional rights.462 Second, Gideon and Duncan coerce
indigents to relinquish some constitutional rights in order to enjoy
others.463 Third, the Gideon and Scott-based conflicts yield unequal
treatment of indigents and non-indigents in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.464 While non-indigents retaining counsel enjoy
all their constitutional rights, indigents enjoy only some. Fourth,
such disparities violate the equality component of the Due Process
Clause.465 While there are a variety of remedies that resolve some
of the unconstitutional conflicts,466 the preferable remedy that
resolves all ten conflicts is replacing the existing proportional
allocation with a transsubstantive allocation.467 That is, extend the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to all criminal defendants and
the right to appointed counsel to all indigent criminal defendants.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part V.A–B.
Supra Part V.C.
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Without a resolution to these ten conflicts, rather than being the
rights that protect, support and complement, the Sixth
Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial are the
rights that undermine the other rights.

